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This research project provides an initial assessment as to whether the government 
should maintain decentralized management of its venture capital (VC) initiatives.  
Previous research focused on the viability of using VC to supplement government R&D 
spending.  In contrast, this research project specifically addresses whether the DoD 
should centralize or decentralize execution of VC.   
The researchers investigated current Government VC initiatives, interviewed 
subject matter experts in the VC industry, and assessed how well the Government VC 
initiatives are poised to fill the DoD’s capability gaps as defined by the QDR.  The 
researchers provide rationale for why VC is a relevant source for Government R&D 
using data from the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) and other literature.  
Ultimately, the research suggests that the government should continue to foster 
decentralized VC execution with increased focus on technology transference.   
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In the past decade, researchers conducted numerous studies concerning the 
decreased funding for research and development (R&D) within the government, 
including in the Department of Defense (DoD).  The president decreased the FY2008 
budget proposal for basic and applied research by 2.1% from the 2007 total, and in “real 
terms, the federal research investment would fall for the fourth year in a row after 
peaking in 2004” (Koizumi, 2007, para. 1).   At the same time, the demand for R&D 
output increased.  This “more with less” phenomenon forced government agencies to 
politic for the ever-scarcer R&D funds.   
According to the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s 
projection, “DOD support of basic and applied research would fall 18% to $5.9 billion,” 
and “NASA research would slide 1.9% to $3.4 billion” (Koizumi, 2007, para. 6).  Federal 
agencies operate in an environment in which R&D investment is more restrictive than 50 
years ago.  Faced with this challenge, many organizations are seeking new methods to 
leverage R&D funds and decrease delivery time to the warfighter.  Some government 
agencies have determined to use venture capital in order to stimulate R&D despite a 
shrinking budget.  With a public venture capital initiative, the government funds small 
companies or entrepreneurial organizations to foster research and development.  (Lerner, 
2002)  Venture capital (VC) could, in fact, be the answer to the DoD’s R&D problems 
because these initiatives promise to leverage taxpayer dollars while outsourcing risk.   
Federal agencies have not agreed on the most efficient method for executing these 
Government VC initiatives; however, Government VC initiatives continue to be 
attractive, and their use is proliferating.  This project deals with ten organizations with 
Government VC initiatives that support equity or equity-like investments in private 
companies.  These organizations include the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program, the Applied Communications Information Networking (ACIN) program, the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s In-Q-Tel, the Army’s National Technology Alliance 
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(NTA) partnership with the Rosettex Technology Venture Group (RTVG), the Army’s 
OnPoint, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Red Planet 
Capital, the Navy’s Commercial Technology Transition Office (CTTO) and its Venture 
Capitalists at Sea (VCs @ Sea) program, and the DoD’s Defense Venture Catalyst 
Initiative (DeVenCI).  Each of these initiatives has a unique structure, vision, and 
purpose; thus, the Government is now challenged with making sure that funds are spent 
efficiently in the midst of this VC propagation.  Unfortunately, “little work has been done 
[…] to insure their greatest effectiveness” (Lerner, 2002, p. 73-74), and “a consensus as 
to how to structure these programs remains elusive” (p. 73). 
Dr. Michael McGrath, Deputy Assistant Secretary to the Navy for Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation, wrestled with this exact issue when he detailed how 
the Navy is evaluating implementation of VC.  Should the Navy “establish a formal 
conduit for information sharing between the VC community and DON,” “create business 
relationships with VC investors and portfolio companies” such as Cooperative Research 
and Development Agreements (CRADAs), contracts, or other transactional authority 
(OTA), “formalize process and funding for the rapid sourcing, screening, experimenting, 
testing, prototyping, and acquisition of innovative venture backed technologies,” or 
“collaborate with Army OnPoint and CIA In-Q-Tel?” (McGrath, 2006, p. 11)  At the 
heart of these questions is the following issue: Should the DoD manage VC in a 
centralized or decentralized manner? 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this MBA professional report is to provide an initial qualitative 
and quantitative foundation of knowledge from which to determine the most efficient 
method of execution for Government VC initiatives in the federal government.  In order 
to develop this foundation of knowledge, there are three objectives to this study: 1) to 
determine the differences, as well as the advantages and disadvantages, of the various 
Government VC initiatives, and 2) to compare and contrast the investment portfolios of 
the Government VC initiatives, and 3) to determine if the VC industry provides a relevant 
source for government R&D. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
We will develop a synthesis of the following research questions to answer the 
foregoing objectives: 1) What are the characteristics of the Government VC initiatives? 
and 2) What are the advantages and disadvantages of the initiatives’ models?    
Next, we will examine the following questions to identify investment trends 
among the Government VC initiatives: 1) What investments have the various 
Government VC initiatives made (i.e., in which industries)? 2) How much have the 
investments been? 3) How have these investments progressed? and 4) What is the 
average age of the firms in which the DoD has invested, relative to the average age of 
firms in which private-sector venture capitalists typically invest? 
Lastly, in order to determine if the VC industry can provide a relevant source for 
Government R&D, we will research the following issues: 1) What are the focus areas 
recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)? 2) What are the levels of 
investment in these QDR focus areas by the VC industry? 3) Are these areas feasible for a 
government-sponsored VC firm? and 4) What are the funding possibilities and 
mechanisms to support VC in these areas?   
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This research project provides an initial assessment as to whether the federal 
government should centrally manage VC or determine that decentralized execution by its 
agencies is the most effective method of execution.  The researchers completed this 
assessment by investigating current Government VC initiatives, examining and 
comparing the structure and investment activities of these initiatives with the 
recommendations of the QDR.  The research conducted on these programs included 
NASA, the Intelligence Community, and the DoD.  The research focused on gaining 
expert opinions from department officials, VC fund managers, and individuals in the 
business community. It further examined the portfolio of the Government VC initiatives 




We first conduct a literature review from professional journals, books, 
government reports, prior theses, and various online sources in order to understand the 
VC industry and Government VC initiatives.  Second, we define our project’s objective 
and research questions based on our literature review.  Third, we assess three areas in 
detail: the VC industry, Government VC initiatives, and the QDR.  This assessment 
builds the foundation for our analysis, which provides a synthesis of the three areas.  
Fourth, we analyze the Government VC initiatives using the information and data from 
the assessment.  The analysis also incorporates interviews from professionals within most 
of the Government VC initiatives and private, independent VC firms.  The analysis 
answers the research questions from each objective.  Finally, we bring together our 
research questions and provide recommendations on whether a centralized Government 
VC initiative is preferred over a decentralized Government VC initiative.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The organization of the study closely follows the methodology described above.  
Chapter II is a background on the VC industry and provides data from the 2006 National 
Venture Capital Association Yearbook (NVCA).  Chapter III describes the Government 
VC initiatives according to timeline, background, spectrum, and data.  The data is 
constructed similarly to the 2006 VC industry data from Chapter II.  Chapter IV assesses 
the QDR and completes the information and data portion of the project.  Chapter V 
begins our analysis and is organized according to the project objectives and their 
respective research questions.  Chapter VI acknowledges three arguments concerning 
Government VC initiatives.  Chapter VII is the concluding chapter; it provides a 
summary and recommendations based on the analysis from Chapter V.    
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II. VENTURE CAPITAL BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW OF VENTURE CAPITAL 
Venture capital, in general, is funding provided to a start-up company by an 
individual or group of individuals to support the growth and development of the 
company’s purpose or product.  There are essentially three types of venture capital: 
private venture capital, corporate venture capital, and public venture capital. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding of 
private and corporate venture capital.  The method of organization and execution for 
these two types of venture capital affects the federal government’s use of its public 
venture capital initiatives.  In order to determine whether the current initiatives are 
efficiently executing taxpayer dollars, readers must understand that there are different 
Models for VC.  The different Models exist because organizations have differing 
motivations for VC.  An understanding of these differences will help clarify the status 
quo for the VC initiatives. 
1. Private Venture Capital  
Private venture capital is “unique as an institutional investor asset class” because 
the “stock is essentially illiquid and worthless until a company matures five to eight years 
down the road” (NVCA, 2007a, p. 7).  These investments are usually high risk, but they 
offer the potential for strong returns.  A company that gains funding through venture 
capital typically raises the finances in a series of “rounds,” which occur annually or bi-
annually.   
Venture capitalists, which are individuals who provide venture capital to the 
companies, can invest as an individual or via a venture capital fund.  A VC fund is an 
investment vehicle that pools the funding of individual investors and provides the capital 
to companies that might be considered too risky for any one individual or bank.  A VC 
fund diversifies the risk among a group of individual venture capitalists. 
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The NVCA points out, however, that VC is not simply money; VC partners 
“become actively engaged with a company, typically taking a board seat” (NVCA, 
2007a, p. 7).  The engagement of the venture capitalist supports the growth and 
development of the company by utilizing the expertise of that person.   
2. Corporate Venture Capital 
Corporate VC is an equity investment in entrepreneurial ventures made by 
established companies such as Intel, Microsoft, and Merck.  The corporation provides 
direct funding to an external, start-up company (Chesbrough, 2002).  In general, 
corporate VC aims to achieve one of two goals: 1) strategic investments to increase the 
corporation’s own sales and profits by identifying advantages between the corporation 
and the new venture (2002), or 2) financial investments the corporations believes will 
earn strong returns based on the corporation’s knowledge of a particular industry (2002). 
Entrepreneurial ventures are most often new, privately owned, start-up firms that 
are seeking capital to continue operations (Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  The ability to 
integrate external knowledge with internal skills is essential to an organization’s dynamic 
capability (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997).  Drucker (1974) argued, 
The search for innovation needs to be organizationally separate and 
outside of the ongoing managerial business. Innovative organizations 
realize that one cannot simultaneously create the new and take care of 
what one already has. They realize that maintenance of the present 
business is far too big a task for the people in it to have much time for 
creating the new, the different business for tomorrow. They also realize 
that taking care of tomorrow is far too big and difficult a task to be diluted 
with concern for today. Both tasks have to be done. But they are different. 
Innovative organizations, therefore, put the new into separate 
organizational components concerned with the creation of the new. (p. 
799)  
Tushman and O’Reilly (2002) share Drucker’s view about separating different 
innovative organizations; they refer to it as “managing innovation streams in 
ambidextrous organizations” (p. 167).  An ambidextrous organization “operates in 
multiple modes simultaneously; managing for short-term efficiency by emphasizing 
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stability and control, as well as for long-term innovation by taking risks and  
learning by doing” (Tushman & O’Reilly, 2002, p. 167). 
Corporate VC success has been cyclical—with firms entering and leaving with 
few long-term commitments (Chesbrough, 2000; Rind, 1980).  Based on past 
performance, it appears that private venture capitalists feel large companies lack the 
flexibility and managerial skills necessary to operate a corporate VC organization 
(Chesbrough, 2000).  Strategy plays a vital role for the survival of a corporate VC 
organization (Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  
Gompers and Lerner (1998) found that corporate VC programs without a strong 
strategic focus are unstable and have a shorter lifespan than those with a stronger 
strategic focus.  Additional published sources agree with Gompers and Lerner (1998) that 
strategy is more important than financial returns for corporate VC programs 
(Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005).  Strategy incorporates external and 
internal capabilities. 
Corporate VC programs that seek external knowledge to leverage internal 
capabilities have greater innovation rates (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005).  Larger 
companies can leverage complementarities, with corporate assets ranging from 
technology to intangible assets such as knowledge-based assets, brand, or the companies’ 
reputation (Chesbrough, 2000).  Gompers and Lerner (1998) also found that “potential 
complementarities with existing lines-of-business suggest that corporate investments may 
also perform well, at least those where there is a strong strategic fit” (p. 25). 
If corporate VC wants to deliver strategic benefits to its sponsoring companies, 
then it cannot merely mirror private VC.  A hybrid between private VC and pure 
corporate VC provides balance to deliver strategic benefits (Chesbrough, 2000).  Pure 
corporate VC, or a new ventures division, operates internally—with management from 
inside the company. In this type of corporate VC, management is not given 
entrepreneurial awards (Rind, 1980).  Chesbrough (2002) and Rind (1980) agreed on a 
hybrid structure that maximizes the strategic benefits of private VC and leverages the 
potential advantages of corporate VC.  
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3. Public Venture Capital 
Public venture capital programs “make equity or equity-like investments in young 
firms, or encourage other intermediaries to make such investments” (Lerner, 2002, p. 73).  
Historically, the federal government’s efforts to support public venture capital programs 
are based on at least one of two assumptions: 1) new firms do not receive enough funding 
from the public sector, or 2) the government can invest in technologies to provide high 
social benefits, which might also encourage private investors to provide funding as well. 
(Lerner, 2002) 
From these definitions, the reader can see that the goal of public venture capital 
differs from private and corporate venture capital.  Instead of seeking financial returns, 
public venture capital aims for “social benefits.”  What are these social benefits?  Lerner 
suggests that new firms that operate on the edge of technology might not receive enough 
funding from investors because of the high risks involved.  In this instance, the 
government may reassure investors in what is called a “certification effect”; this could 
help investors overcome their concerns to confidently invest in these firms (Lerner, 
2002).  From this perspective, the social benefit of public venture capital programs is the 
development of a project for the federal government’s use that might otherwise have 
never been developed. 
The second social benefit is the idea of R&D spillovers.  Lerner explains that 
investments in activities that generate positive externalities, such as R&D and pollution 
control, may not provide financial returns, but have positive spillovers that help other 
firms or society as a whole.  Because the financial return may not justify the execution of 
the project, the government should consider the benefits of getting involved (Lerner, 
2002).     
Both of these arguments lead directly to the venture capital initiatives discussed in 
this report.  The ever-decreasing R&D budget has made necessary a method for accessing 
and supporting product development for the federal agencies.  The structure, objectives, 
and methods for these specific initiatives are discussed in the following chapter. 
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B. VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 2006 
According to the 2007 National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) Yearbook, 
the United States’ VC industry maintained its consistent growth in 2006.  The areas 
analyzed in the VC industry are: industry resources, investments, portfolio company 
valuations, exits (Initial Public Offerings and Acquisitions), and performance (NVCA, 
2007a).  The data, figures, and tables presented in this section are from the NVCA 
Yearbook (2007a), published by Thomson Financial.    
A Government VC has different objectives, which must complement its strategic 
objective within the VC industry.  The Government VC does not necessarily need to 
mirror the VC industry’s performance.  However, the Government VC needs to 
understand the VC industry and what it has to offer.  The following data is presented on 
the different areas of the VC industry for 2006 and provides insight into some of the 
questions raised in the introduction.   
1. VC Industry Resources 
Venture capital under management, the total dollar amount available for VC 
investments, was $235.8 billion for 2006, a decrease of $29.6 billion from 2005.  
However since 1998, total capital under management has increased 161%.  The total 
capital under management is broken down by firm type in the following figure:  
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Private 
Independent 39015 49867 73491 117891 183411 207142 208333 208497 214724 220847 197827 
Financial 
Institutions 5960 8485 11590 17949 26641 28784 27974 27051 26806 24912 20687 
Corporations 3096 3339 4150 8596 15397 17165 17182 16920 16303 17112 15073 
Other 729 1109 1268 1564 2351 2708 2710 2731 2867 2529 2214 
Total 48800 62800 90500 146000 227800 255800 256200 255200 260700 265400 235800 
Figure 1.   Total Capital under Management by Firm Type, 1980 to 2006 ($ Millions) 
[From NVCA, 2007] 
 
Private independent firms managed the largest amount of capital with 84% of the 
total, followed by financial institutions with 9%, corporations with 6%, and others with 
1%.  The top five states with the most capital under management were California, 
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Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and Maryland.  These five states managed 80% 
of the total capital under management, with California continuing its dominance with 
$93.2 billion. (NVCA, 2007a)  The following figure shows the total capital managed by 
the top five states: 
 
State   ($ Millions) 
CA   93,206.20
MA  39,774.70
NY   31,063.70
CT   14,290.20
MD  9,729.70
Total*   188,064.50
* Total includes above 5 states only 
Figure 2.   Top 5 States by Capital under Management, 2006 
 [From NVCA, 2007] 
 
At the end of 2006, approximately 43% of all venture capital firms managed up to 
$50 million, while 21% managed at least $250 million.  96 firms managed at least $500 
million, while 98 firms managed up to only $10 million.  The following figure breaks 
down the distribution of firms by capital managed and the budget for each firm (i.e. 98 
firms managed or had $0-$10 million for investments):   
 
Figure 3.   Distribution of Firms by Capital Managed, 2006 
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Capital under Management ($ Millions)
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Venture capital continued its trend of concentrating greater amounts of capital in 
fewer hands, with the number of existing firms dropping from 872 to 798.  On average, 
each firm was responsible for financing about four companies in 2006, contrasted to three 
companies in 2005.  While the average fund size increased by $8 million from 2005 to 
2006, the average firm size decreased by $8.9 million.  Recent data of closed funds show 
that most venture funds significantly exceed the designated life of 10 years (NVCA, 
2007a). 
2. VC Industry Investments 
The amount of VC invested in 2006 increased to $25.9 billion—a 14% increase 
from 2005.  The computer software sector led with 19% of the financing, followed by 
biotechnology and then communications (NVCA, 2007a).  The following figures show 
the investments by industry group and sector:  










Information Technology 1,858 14.9 672 3.5 
Medical/Health/Life 
Science 669 7.7 293 1.7 
Non-high Technology 383 3.4 150 0.7 
Total 2,910 25.9 1,115 5.9 
Figure 4.   2006 Investments by Industry Class [From NVCA, 2007] 
 
 
Figure 5.   Venture Capital Investments in 2006 by Industry Sector 





















The leading recipient of venture capital investment was California, with $12.5 billion (or 
48% of the total invested).  That 48% was the highest percentage since 1983 and 
represented investments in 1,224 portfolio companies.  Massachusetts ($2.8 billion), 
Texas ($1.4 billion), New York ($1.3 billion), and Washington ($1 billion) were the other 
leading recipients.  The District of Columbia had the highest percentage gain for states 
with 256%—receiving at least $100 million (NVCA, 2007a). 
Startup and seed stage companies received $1.1 billion in investments, a 44.2% 
increase from 2005.  This high percentage is explained by the industry finishing up 
existing projects and focusing on new, upcoming deals.  Financing increased in all stages 
except the later stage, but the later stage still brought in 36% of all financing.  The 
expansion stage received the most: $11.5 billion (NVCA, 2007a). 
Initial-round and follow-on financing both increased; each was the highest since 
2001.  On average, a company received $5.26 million in initial-round financing and 
$10.25 million in follow-on financing.  The total number of companies receiving 
financing was 2,910 in 2006 (NVCA, 2007a).  Figure 6 shows the venture capital 
investments by stage.  Figures 7 and 8 show investments by first versus follow-on rounds 
by total dollars invested and total number of companies:  
 
Stage 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Startup-Seed 1297 1287 1316 1769 3254 3119 722 297 338 412 795 1146 
Early 1770 2849 3580 5549 11910 25672 8708 3904 3546 4032 3689 3951 
Expansion 3794 5461 7728 10544 30182 59867 23088 12383 10047 9261 8678 11479 
Later 1266 1682 2279 3227 8860 16325 8179 5246 5754 8433 9617 9347 
Total 8126 11279 14903 21088 54206 104983 40696 21830 19685 22138 22778 25922 
Figure 6.   Venture Capital Investments 1995 to 2006 by Stage ($ Millions)               










Year First Follow-on Total 
1995 4151.7 3974.7 8126.5 
1996 4325.0 6953.5 11278.6 
1997 4898.5 10004.5 14903.0 
1998 7172.3 13916.1 21088.4 
1999 16044.9 38160.8 54205.7 
2000 28945.1 76038.2 104983.3 
2001 7445.8 33250.4 40696.3 
2002 4372.3 17457.7 21829.9 
2003 3948.0 15737.0 19684.9 
2004 4752.4 17385.3 22137.7 
2005 5603.1 17175.7 22778.8 
2006 5869.0 20053.1 25922.2 
Figure 7.   Venture Capital Investments,  
First vs. Follow-on Rounds ($ Millions) 
[From NVCA, 2007] 
 
Year 
# of Co.s Receiving 
Initial Round 
Financing 




# of Co.s 
Receiving  
Financing* 
1995 893 754 1545 
1996 1144 1134 2078 
1997 1289 1446 2536 
1998 1411 1794 2973 
1999 2443 2398 4410 
2000 3368 3633 6340 
2001 1219 2733 3787 
2002 838 1890 2619 
2003 746 1767 2416 
2004 903 1774 2574 
2005 995 1768 2646 
2006 1115 1957 2910 
*NVCA doesn't explain why the total doesn't add 
up correctly  
Figure 8.   Venture Capital Investments, First vs. Follow-on Rounds  
(Total # of Co.s) 
[From NVCA, 2007] 
3. Portfolio Company Valuations 
The improvement in the public markets helped increase the average venture round 
valuations in 2006.  For companies receiving financing between 1995 and 2006, 
communication companies had the highest average valuation at $78 million, followed by 
the computer hardware and services sector with $75.1 million.  The average value for 
additional rounds ($80.7 million) following first-round financing was higher than first 
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rounds ($14.9 million) in 2006.  The average post-initial public offering (IPO) valuation 
was more than two times the average pre-IPO valuation.  The post-offering valuation 
increased from 2005 to 2006, with an average valuation of $390.2 million for IPOs.  
However, this increase was still far below record levels and emphasized the need for 
venture capitalists to efficiently distribute capital to portfolio companies (NVCA, 2007a). 
4. Exits (IPOs and Acquisitions) 
Venture-backed IPOs increased to 57 in 2006 from 56 the previous year and 
accounted for just 34% of all U.S.-based IPOs.  However, these IPOs had a 35% return in 
2006, contrasted to 13.5% for the S&P 500 and 8.2% for NASDAQ.  The biotechnology 
industry had the highest venture-backed IPOs (with 17) and the highest offering (with 
$855 million).  The median age of all venture-backed IPOs increased to 96 months in 
2006 from 72 months the previous year.  On average, only one in six companies ever 












Amt        
($ mil) 
Mean 




Value      
($ mil) 
Med Post 




Value    
($ mil) 
Med Age 







1995 204 8117 33 41 31073 110 155 7 9 
1996 273 11539 32 42 56538 110 207 6 8 
1997 137 4820 30 35 22126 108 160 6 8 
1998 78 3782 41 48 17253 182 221 5 7 
1999 266 20395 63 77 134000 342 496 4 6 
2000 263 25419 73 97 133119 247 504 5 7 
2001 40 3419 71 85 18004 322 439 6 11 
2002 22 2109 71 96 7950 223 361 7 11 
2003 29 2023 66 70 8257 228 285 8 9 
2004 93 11015 69 118 61091 255 657 7 8 
2005 56 4461 66 80 16464 203 294 6 8 
2006 57 5117 76 90 22242 255 390 8 10 
Figure 9.   Venture-backed IPOs, 1995 to 2006,  
Value and Age Characteristics   [From NVCA, 2007] 
 
According to the NVCA Yearbook (2007a), the most feasible route to exit for 
venture-backed companies was through a merger and acquisition (M&A).  Venture-
 15
backed M&A activity decreased slightly to 336, but accounted for 85% of the total exits 
in 2006.  The software industry had the highest number of exits (with 125), which was 
more than four times the next leading sector.  The average purchase price for the M&A 
exits for 2006 was $109.8 million (NVCA, 2007a). 
5. VC Industry Performance 
Venture funds had a one-year, 7% internal rate of return (IRR) for 2006.  The 
five-year average is the only one with a negative IRR due to the decline in the early 
2000s, but all other time horizons had a positive IRR.  Early-stage-focused funds had the 
lowest IRR, which was different from historical pattern.  Early-stage funds usually 
outperformed other funds, which pattern was consistent with financial theory of risk and 
return.  However, in recent years, the early-stage funds were valued flatly until it received 
additional funds in latter stages of financing (NVCA, 2007a).  The following figure 
displays the IRR for all venture and private equity investments for different time horizons 
and fund type:  
 
Fund Type 1YR 3YR 5YR 10YR 20YR 
Seed/Early 
Focused 2.6 5.5 -5.4 38.3 20.5 
Balanced Focused 7.5 12.9 1.9 16.9 14.6 
Later Stage 
Focused 14.5 8.9 1.8 9.0 13.7 
All Venture 7.0 9.1 -1.2 20.5 16.5 
Buyout Funds 21.6 15.6 9.1 8.8 13.2 
Mezzanine Debt -0.4 4.8 2.9 5.9 8.4 
All Private Equity 16.5 13.1 5.8 11.2 14.0 
Figure 10.   Net IRR for Investment Horizon Ending 09/30/2006 
 for Private Equity Funds [From NVCA, 2007] 
 
Venture investors received $9.8 billion in the nine months in 2006, in contrast to 
$20.2 billion from 2005.  This was due to the poor IPO markets and depressed acquisition 
markets.  According to the NVCA Yearbook (2007a), “When there is too much money 
chasing too few good deals, those good deals tend to be bid up in price early on, making 
it difficult for venture capital general partners to reward their investors with suitable 
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returns” (p. 15).  One way to forecast the expected future liquidity is to compare the 
annual VC investments to the amount of new capital in the public markets.  In 2006, VC 
investment was $26 billion, compared to $158 billion in the public market.  This six-to-
one ratio is probably short of what is needed and a signal that the amount of investment 
by the VC industry is too high (NVCA, 2007a). 
Assessment of the VC industry provides the researchers a framework with which 
to assess and analyze the various  Government VC initiatives.  The next section is an 
assessment of some current  Government VC initiatives.  Some of the same areas from 
the VC industry will be incorporated in this discussion.  The goal of assessing the  
Government VC initiatives is not to make a direct comparison to the VC industry, but 






III.  VENTURE CAPITAL INITIATIVES 
A. TIMELINE OF GOVERNMENT VC INITIATIVES 
In this section, the researchers discuss nine Government VC initiatives: the SBIR 
program, In-Q-Tel, the CTTO, the ACIN program, the NTA RTVG, the VCs @ Sea 
program, OnPoint, Red Planet Capital, and DeVenCI.  The figure below details the 
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Figure 11.   Timeline of  Government VC initiatives  
B. BACKGROUND OF GOVERNMENT VC INITIATIVES 
This section provides background information on the structure, objectives, and 
methods for the Government VC initiatives that are the focus of this report.   
1. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program 
In 1982, Congress passed the Small Business Innovation Development Act, which 
created the SBIR program and “emphasized the benefits of technological innovation and 
the ability of small businesses to transform the results of R&D into new products” (GAO, 
1999, p. 14).  In the Act, Congress established four primary goals for the SBIR program:  
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1. Stimulate technological innovation.  
2. Use small businesses to meet federal R&D needs.   
3. Foster and encourage participation by minorities and disadvantaged 
persons in technological innovation. 
4. Increase the private sector’s commercialization of innovations derived 
from federal R&D. 
The policy directives of the SBIR program are developed and managed by the 
Small Business Administration (SBA).  These directives state: 
[That] to be eligible for an award, a small business must meet the 
following characteristics: independently owned and operated, other than 
the dominant firm in the field in which it is proposing a SBIR project, 
organized and operated for profit, an employer of 500 or fewer employees, 
the primary source of employment for the project’s principal investigator 
at the time of the award and during the period when the research is 
conducted, and at least 51% owned by U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted 
permanent resident aliens. (GAO, 1999, p. 14) 
There are three phases of the SBIR program.  Phase I cannot exceed six months, and 
grants within that timeframe cannot surpass $50,000 to the awardee. Phase I “was 
designed to determine the scientific and technical merit and the feasibility of a proposed 
idea” (p. 14).  In its 1982 specifications, Phase II could not exceed two years, surpass 
$500,000 granted to the awardee and was designed to improve the technology developed 
in Phase I.  Then in 1992, Congress directed the SBA to raise the grant amounts to 
$100,000 for Phase I and $750,000 for Phase II efforts.  In contrast to the first two 
phases, Phase III “has no general limits in time or dollar amounts,” and “a Phase III 
project must obtain funds from non-SBIR sources in the federal government or in the 
private sector” (p. 14) to include VC firms. 
2. In-Q-Tel 
In 1998, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) explored the validity of VC to 
enhance R&D procurement.  The CIA realized the fundamental differences between VC 
and public R&D investment.  Specifically, the CIA recognized the belief that  
 
 19
governments, especially in the United States, normally do not get involved with equity 
investment and ownership of companies.  However, despite this difference, leadership in 
the CIA realized that:  
The Agency was struggling to keep pace with change in this new digital 
age, where information was abundant and the communication medium was 
high technology. The Agency was experiencing an “IT gap” caused by the 
speed of change and innovation in the commercial high technology sector 
[…the] CIA recognized that it needed to develop IT quickly. To do this, 
the leadership acknowledged that the Agency needed to tap into the 
private sector IT world’s high energy. (Business Executives for National 
Security [BENS], 2001, p. 1)    
This recognition resulted in the establishment of In-Q-Tel, a non-profit, 
government-chartered corporation with the stated goal: “to exploit and develop new and 
emerging information technologies and pursue R&D that produces innovative solutions 
to the most difficult problems facing the CIA and Intelligence Community” (BENS, 
2001, p. 6). 
Norman Augustine, former CEO of Lockheed Martin, founded In-Q-Tel at the 
request of the CIA in response to George Tenet’s “Strategic Direction” initiative: 
Beginning with the critical field of IT, we will pursue this [new] approach 
through the creation of an external nonprofit enterprise designed to be 
electronically connected to leading research throughout the country. This 
new entity will speed insertion of mature technologies, support rapid 
development of mission-critical applications, and enhance our ability to 
attract the skills and expertise vital to our success. (BENS, 2001, p. 5)  
In-Q-Tel was formed to be an agile and flexible entity that could work independently 
with firms in Silicon Valley and throughout the world. In-Q-Tel was a mix of corporate 
strategic VC, business, nonprofit and Government R&D Models (Lerner, Hardymon, 
Book, & Leamon, 2004).  The In-Q-Tel Model was not a substitute for traditional 
Government R&D funding, but rather leveraged government and private-sector 
investments in research (Cotell, 2006). 
In-Q-Tel was initially a technology systems integrator that searched for 
commercial off-the-shelf technologies to meet the CIA’s needs (BENS, 2001).  In-Q-Tel 
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has evolved from a systems integrator into a catalyst to developing technologies that are 
commercially viable and serve the specific needs of the intelligence community.  In-Q-
Tel can serve as a partner with the public, with private companies, and with academic 
institutions and laboratories (Molzahn, 2003).  
In-Q-Tel is comprised of four discrete entities: the CIA, In-Q-Tel Interface Center 
(QIC), In-Q-Tel, and commercial firms/academia.  The QIC is an organization within the 
CIA that works exclusively with In-Q-Tel by ensuring that the CIA’s requirements are 
accurately identified before they are passed to In-Q-Tel; the QIC is also responsible for 
the transition of commercial IT solutions from In-Q-Tel to the Agency.  The QIC and In-
Q-Tel use a collaborative process, the “Q Process,” for the development and execution of 
projects (Molzahn, 2003).  The QIC provides In-Q-Tel with a “Problem Set” that outlines 
the investments in which the firm would operate (Lerner et al., 2004). 
The first “Problem Set” defined by QIC in 1999 had four investment areas: 
information security, internet, knowledge generation, and distributed architectures.  The 
investment areas were subdivided and further refined before QIC distributed the 
“Problem Set” to In-Q-Tel.  The “Problem Set” evolved to include five areas: Geo-spatial 
technology, distributed data collection, security and privacy, knowledge management, 
and search and discovery.  The “Problem Set” does not change in response to current 
events, but rather is designed to provide In-Q-Tel with a clear investment framework 
(Lerner et al., 2004). 
Dr. Catherine Cotell, In-Q-Tel’s Vice President in 2006, asserted before the 
Science Committee of the House of Representatives that, “Before In-Q-Tel makes an 
investment, members of three teams conduct diligence to ensure that the investment is on 
firm footing” (Cotell, 2006, The In-Q-Tel Approach, ¶2).  The first team is composed of 
members of QIC, as previously mentioned.  The second team consists of In-Q-Tel’s staff 
of technology experts who try to match new emerging technologies with the needs of the 
intelligence community.  The third team is In-Q-Tel’s venture team members, who are 
responsible for researching the market and reviewing the company’s business  
plan and management team (Cotell, 2006).  
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The CIA charters and provides funding for In-Q-Tel from the federal intelligence 
budget appropriations (Lerner et al., 2004).  However, In-Q-Tel is an independent entity 
and does not need approval from the CIA for its business deals (Molzahn, 2003).  In-Q-
Tel was chartered to invest in commercially viable businesses for many reasons.  The 
CIA wanted to keep the companies that produced software and technology for the CIA in 
business.  Technologies targeted for the commercial sector were more flexible, able to 
change and cost-effective compared to one-off customized products.  In-Q-Tel also hoped 
for some financial returns, even though its first priority was return on technology for the 
intelligence community (Lerner et al., 2004). 
3. National Technology Alliance (NTA) Rosettex Technology Venture 
Group (RTVG) 
The NTA RTVG was established in 2002, and is “a U.S. Government program 
with an objective of influencing commercial and dual use technology development in 
support of national security and defense requirements” (Deitch, 2004, p. 25).  The 
organization aims “to reduce development and sustainment costs across the life cycle” 
(Deitch, 2004, p. 25).  In 2002, the NTA partnered with Rosettex Technology and 
Venture Group (RTVG), using Other Transaction Authority (OTA), to establish a 
cooperative joint venture to enable the government to obtain “access to best of class 
solutions from a team of over 70 information technology organizations representing 
universities, non-traditional contractors and traditional system integrators” (Deitch, 2004, 
p. 25). 
The OTA arrangement supported relaxed “language regarding Intellectual 
Property” to enhance the program’s attractiveness to industry (Deitch, 2004, p. 25).  The 
NTA’s chief technology officers are concerned with three primary technology areas: 
Geo-spatial intelligence, information-processing analysis and management, and digital 
technology infrastructure.  Deitch (2004) listed Rosettex’s current programs as:                               
• Video motion-mining techniques, archiving, retrieval, and exploitation 
capabilities development for Defense and Homeland Security applications 
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• Development of integrated navigation and accurate geo-positioning from 
video imagery to enhance position location 
• Pre-commercialization prototyping of a neural network image processing, 
pattern recognition and learning model 
• Prototyping of eye-imagery registration, fusion and analysis tools to create 
3-D retinal maps for early eye disease diagnosis 
• Adapting the discovered capabilities of super fusion and super resolution 
to DoD and IC use (bullets in original, p. 25) 
Rosettex Venture Fund is independent of RTVG, but receives funds from the profits 
generated from NTA contracts (Caterinicchia, 2002).  The NTA has no direct equity 
ownership under this structure, but this fund invests in companies with technologies that 
have dual-use potential for the military and the commercial sector (Deitch, 2004).  
Gilman Louie, the first president and CEO of In-Q-Tel, was one of the advisors to the 
fund (Caterinicchia, 2002).  
4. Navy’s Commercial Technology Transition Officer (CTTO) 
In 1999, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and 
Acquisition) created the CTTO position with the objectives to: provide objective, 
independent, system-oriented technology assessments, promote the rapid insertion of 
technology from any source, advise on matching the Navy's business and technology 
insertion strategies, evaluate potentially disruptive technologies and alert leadership to 
their prospects, and to develop policies and tools to improve Navy utilization of 
technology (Office of Naval Research, 2007).  In seven years, the CTTO has provided 
funding for 55 technology transition deals.   
The Office of Naval Research is responsible for the CTTO.  In concert with the 
CTTO, the ONR supports the Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) Venture 
Capital Technology Panel.  This panel works with the CTTO to develop a technology 
roadmap that identifies technologies to incorporate into the Navy (Office of Naval 
Research, 2007).  In general, the CTTO works to identify the Navy’s operational needs 
and match them with potential solutions in the commercial industry.  There are two 
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elements to this activity: “spin-out” and “spin-in” technologies.  Spin-out activities are 
Navy intellectual property licensed to the commercial sector, while spin-in activities 
provide commercial technologies to the Navy.  The hope with spin-in activities is that the 
service will become more aware of emerging technologies that have the potential to 
support the Navy’s current and future operational needs (Lawlor, 2003).   
5. Venture Capitalists @ Sea (VC @ Sea) Program 
In 2003, the CTTO embarked upon the VCs @ Sea program to get venture 
capitalists involved in spin-out and spin-in technologies.  In contrast to In-Q-Tel, the 
CTTO wanted to explore the possibility of introducing new technologies into the Navy 
without having to request funds from Congress (Lawlor, 2003).  This approach resulted 
in six deals with companies that possessed promising technologies. 
The VCs @ Sea program supported this relationship by fostering trust between 
the venture capitalists and the government.  The CTTO engaged with some of the top-tier 
VCs in the country and provided them the opportunity to interface with the Navy and 
Marines including trips aboard ships to see first-hand how the technologies would be 
used.  This feedback provided the VCs with a better understanding of the requirements 
(Lawlor, 2003).  Despite this relative success, the CTTO no longer executes the VCs @ 
Sea program due to budget constraints.  
6. Applied Communication and Information Networking (ACIN) 
In the fall of 2001, the U.S. Army's Communications—Electronics Command 
(CECOM), in conjunction with Drexel University and Sarnoff, opened ACIN in Camden, 
New Jersey (Deitch, 2004).  The building complex is a “state-of-the-art ‘wired’ modular 
office environment and shared information technology laboratory space,” which fosters 
“collaboration, creativity, and flexibility, in order to facilitate the commercialization of 
technology” (Deitch, 2004, p. 17).   The ACIN environment is meant to provide a 
“‘grow-as-you-go’ space [to support] the development of companies as they expand from 
one to 25 workers” (Deitch, 2004, p. 17-18).  As an incentive to industry, data rights for 
commercial purposes were retained, thereby facilitating the flexibility to spin technology 
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into the small-business sector.  Designed to return investment back into the program, 5% 
of royalties paid resulting from work performed under the ACIN program is to be utilized 
for maintenance and operations of the ACIN Center of Excellence (Deitch, 2004).   
The goals and objectives of ACIN are: Education and training, rapid technology 
exploitation, technology assessment and evaluations, leveraging commercial industry to 
better address government needs, commercialization, and user support.  ACIN focuses on 
innovation through these goals and objectives.  In order to facilitate commercialization, 
ACIN partners “with industry, universities and venture capital firms to bring technology 
to market, to include licensing intellectual property, and incubating new companies” 
(Deitch, 2004, p. 18). 
ACIN is unique because it is the first incubator devoted to defense technologies.  
The arrangement provides tangible benefits for both industry as well as the government 
by providing companies with office space and by allowing the government to get a first 
look at emerging technologies.  This open “architecture” helps the military increase its 
innovative practices by gaining insights into organizations and technologies that would 
not normally be doing business with the government (Deitch, 2004).  
7. OnPoint 
Encouraged by the success of In-Q-Tel, Congress included $25 million in the 
FY2002 DoD Appropriations Bill for the Army to utilize VC.  According to Jason 
Rottenberg (2006), the current director of OnPoint, the purpose of the appropriations bill 
is: 
to fund a venture capital investment corporation (VCI) with the 
expectation that such a vehicle would provide the Army with greater 
visibility into the technical development activities of technology  
development companies and would accelerate the transition of new or 
significantly improved technologies into the Army more quickly and 
efficiently. (p. 1)   
Initially, the Army hired MILCOM Technologies (a small equity firm with 
experience in the defense and commercial sectors) to manage VCI activities.  However, 
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in 2003, the Army worked with MILCOM to establish OnPoint Technologies as the 
Army’s VC initiative (Rottenberg, 2006). 
OnPoint is specifically interested in companies that do not normally do business 
with the government.  OnPoint helps these companies transfer technologies to better 
equip soldiers and/or reduce the costs associated with such equipment.  OnPoint focuses 
primarily on power technologies, such as portable fuel cells, improved rechargeable 
batteries, and numerous power-generation technologies (Rottenberg, 2006). 
8. NASA’s Red Planet Capital 
NASA initiated the VC project Red Planet Capital in 2006.  Congress approved 
the program for Red Planet Capital, but the White House disapproved.  Red Planet 
Capital is now a private venture capital firm with investors from the major aerospace 
companies.  Red Planet Capital is now called Astro-Lab Ventures and still plans to work 
with NASA, but under a different construct than did Red Planet Capital (Burnette, 2007).  
Red Planet Capital originally planned to address three key challenges:  
1. Attract and motivate private-sector innovators and investors who have not 
typically conducted business with NASA, including tapping more 
efficiently into the pool of small, leading-edge organizations which are 
responsible for much of the innovative high-tech thinking and research in 
the U.S., 
2. Leverage existing external capital to encourage development of 
technologies and products likely to be of future use to NASA’s mission, 
and 
3. Improve and expedite public/private partnership formation through 
redesign of administrative, management, and legal processes and 
procedures. 
Red Planet Capital was designed as an investment vehicle to support innovative, dual-use 
technologies for NASA’s mission and commercial use.   
NASA adopted the In-Q-Tel Model to design Red Planet Capital.  In-Q-Tel’s 
former president, Michael Griffin, the administrator of NASA, was a key player in the 
project (Kaufman, 2006).  Red Planet Capital planned to invest in new, promising 
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technologies via equity financing instruments and by leveraging existing private-sector, 
corporate, and financial venture funds.   
9. Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative (DeVenCI) 
Recently, the DoD established DeVenCI in order to identify the potential benefits 
of VC.  In contrast to initialization of earlier Government VC initiatives, DeVenCI and 
the Pentagon are subtly approaching the potential use of VC by providing “a forum for 
Department of Defense officials and venture capitalists to meet to prioritize the military’s 
needs, which are then communicated to technology companies” (Carlson, 2006, ¶ 7).  
DeVenCI’s website says it aims to accomplish this broad goal using workshops, technical 
expositions, industry outreach, and its web portal.  These mediums will increase the 
visibility of DoD needs to commercial companies and technology area experts—hence 
earning the term “catalyst” in its name (DeVenCI, 2007).  
We emphasize that DeVenCI is a catalyst; it does not make investments in 
companies.  DeVenCI does not leverage positions in commercial companies, nor does it 
aid in technology transfer.   This approach requires specific DoD users to be responsible 
for any long-term development and procurement of promising technologies (DeVenCI, 
2007). 
C.  SPECTRUM OF GOVERNMENT VC INITIATIVES 
The preceding section provided a general overview of Government VC initiatives.  
The organizational structures, operational methods, and end-goals vary considerably 
among these programs.  This paper’s thesis of whether the government should centralize 
or decentralize VC execution centers on the core differences of the initiatives.  Are these 
differences good or bad?  Do the differences support or hurt the government’s efforts to 
enhance R&D?  We attempt to gain the insight necessary to answer these questions by 
introducing a spectrum for the Government VC initiatives.    
Why is a spectrum important?  By defining a spectrum of the Government VC 
initiatives, the researchers can gain a better understanding for why the initiatives are 
different and an understanding of how they achieve their goals.  At the same time, we can 
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compare and contrast the initiatives to determine the relative effectiveness of each 
initiative’s approach.  Ultimately, the spectrum will help us with our determination of 
whether to centralize or decentralize VC execution.   
The concept for categorizing government efforts along a spectrum is not new.  In 
fact, in July 2004, the National Defense University’s (NDU) Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy (CTNSP) presented a briefing entitled “Actions to Enhance the 
Injection of Commercial IT in DoD Systems: A Synthesis Perspective.”  In this meeting, 
the CTNSP recognized the very same problems that the entire DoD struggles with 
concerning IT: 1) IT is critical to the transformation of the DoD; 2) the cost of IT is 
challenging, and 3) innovation in IT is primarily occurring in the commercial sector 
(CTNSP, 2004, p. 9).  All of these problems were increasingly challenging because the 
commercial sector viewed the DoD as “non-attractive, non-transparent, and very 
isolated” (CTNSP, 2004, p. 10).   
As the CTNSP struggled with identifying improved methods for accessing 
innovative technologies, it surveyed existing methods and developed a spectrum with 
which categorize the methods’ actions.  The CTNSP analysis of the DoD’s engagement 
strategy in 2004 evaluated efforts like SBIR, Army VC, In-Q-Tel, DARPA, and the 
Navy’s CTTO and categorized them along two axes: activity type and company maturity.  




Figure 12.   DoD’s Current Engagement Strategy (2004) [From CTNSP, 2004] 
 
For this paper, we have categorized the existing Government VC initiatives along 
a spectrum according to the method the VC initiative uses to facilitate the exchange of 
information between the commercial sector and the government.  What are the different 
methods for facilitating this exchange? 
The primary distinction between the Government VC initiatives in this paper is 
how funds are used to facilitate the exchange of information between the commercial 
sector and the government.  There are three Models on the spectrum: the Equity 
Investment Model, the Grants Model, and the Communication Catalyst Model.  Figure 13 
shows how the Government VC initiatives are arrayed along this spectrum.     
 
Figure 13.   Government VC Initiative Spectrum 
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1. Equity Investment Model 
For the Equity Investment Model, the government provides funding to an external 
organization to purchase equity in a company.  For the initiatives covered in this paper, 
the external organizations are independent, non-profit entities.  Why are they purchasing 
equity?  The Government VC initiatives use equity ownership to leverage control within 
the company.  Implicit in this arrangement is the Government VC initiatives’ ability to 
gain insight and influence the development of the product.  In this construct, In-Q-Tel, 
OnPoint, and Red Planet Capital fall under the Equity Investment Model.   
When In-Q-Tel was initially established, senior leadership wanted the 
organization to focus on early-stage COTS products because the leadership believed In-
Q-Tel could then adapt the product for government use (Arlen, 2004).  The aim was to 
identify IT areas with a high potential for dual-use.  The CIA and In-Q-Tel absolutely did 
not want to develop new products; instead, they hoped to modify existing commercial 
products and enable timely technology transition.  They realized that the commercial 
sector’s concerns with the government needed to be overcome, so the “In-Q-Tel Board 
worked to position In-Q-Tel’s evolution into a strategic venture capital Model as a way 
for the CIA to share risk with industry and with financial players”  (Arlen, 2004).  The 
venture capital model became a way for the CIA and In-Q-Tel to overcome their 
challenges in the traditional construct of customer and vendor.  In-Q-Tel established the 
model other Government VC initiatives have attempted to copy.  By having a seat on the 
board of each company in which it invests, In-Q-Tel gains unique insights into the 
problems encountered by the company and is able to provide direction and guidance.  
(Arlen, 2004)  The CIA purposely designed In-Q-Tel to have this equity relationship 
because of its distinct differences from traditional acquisition procedures, and this 
relationship provided In-Q-Tel with rare insight and influence.  (Arlen, 2004)  Despite its 
similarity to the VC industry, In-Q-Tel is not in business to make money.  It is interested 
in a financial return in order to be self-sustaining at some point in the future, but In-Q-Tel 
really uses the Equity Investment Model “as a tool to gain access to technology” (Cox & 
McGee, 2005, p. 48).     
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OnPoint’s creation came out of the Army’s similar need to gain access to 
innovative technologies.  The Army studied the In-Q-Tel Model and realized its benefits.  
However, OnPoint was more interested in finding technologies in the latter stage of 
development than in mirroring In-Q-Tel’s initial focus on early-stage development.  This 
latter-stage involvement would limit financial returns, but “more important than the high 
ROI, is the importance of OnPoint finding companies that have a strong probability of 
success” (Cox & McGee, 2005, p. 65).  OnPoint works with VC investors to fund, 
develop, and deliver technologies for industry and the government (Rottenberg, 2006).  
OnPoint similarly focuses on investments, but the organization stresses accelerated 
transition of the technology for timely delivery to the Army’s soldiers (Rottenberg, 
2006). 
NASA hoped to gain access to the commercial source of innovation as well to 
improve its aerospace and biomedical capabilities; hence, it created Red Planet Capital to 
directly invest government money in companies that might meet its needs (Kaufman, 
2006).  NASA’s initial vision for Red Planet Capital was an investment vehicle to 
support innovative, dual-use technologies (NASA Request for Information, 2006).  Just 
as several other government agencies had, NASA recognized that the rate of innovation 
in the commercial sector outpaced that in the federal government. Thus, NASA structured 
Red Planet Capital to invest in technology using equity financing vehicles and to work 
with private-sector corporate and/or financial venture funds (Rottenberg, 2006).  To this 
end, Red Planet Capital was to be led by three veterans of the VC industry, managing $75 
million in taxpayer funds for a five-year period.  It should be noted that, while Red Planet 
Capital technically falls under the Equity Investment Model, the organization is no longer 
affiliated with NASA. As mentioned previously, the President cut the funding for Red 
Planet Capital for the FY 2008 Budget. 
2. Grant Model 
Under the Grant Model, the government provides funds to the commercial sector 
to perfect mature technology or provides funds to support a public need that companies 
would not invest in otherwise.  As opposed to the Equity Model, the government-
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affiliated VC does not acquire ownership in the company.  The expectation in the Grant 
Model is that there will be an exchange of technical expertise to develop a technology 
that may help the government.  If the product does not reach maturity, the relationship 
comes to an end.  The NTA RTVG, SBIR program, and ACIN are Grant Models. 
The NTA’s website states that the “primary goal of the NTA is to partner 
commercial technology solutions to government user technology needs and then create 
new or enhanced commercial products where the cost of development is leveraged across 
a broad user community”  (National Technology Alliance, 2007).  The NTA RTVG 
brings together universities, institutes, laboratories and commercial companies to conduct 
research, product development, and commercialization (Deitch, 2004).  The objective of 
the NTA RTVG is to gain access to commercial and dual-use technology with the hope 
of reducing lifecycle costs.  (Deitch, 2004)  To achieve these goals, the NTA RTVG has 
partnered with over 80 leading IT organizations from the commercial, academic, and 
research arenas.  These organizations try to provide “technology solutions and 
commercialization capabilities to translate science into solutions” (NTA, 2007).  The goal 
of the NTA RTVG is to leverage the private sector’s investment in the areas of Chemical, 
Biological, and Radiological Defense; Digital Technology Infrastructure; Geospatial 
Intelligence; Information Processing, Analysis and Management; and Independent 
Assessment and Evaluation.  Under this construct, the government maintains no direct 
equity ownership because of the separation between the government and Rosettex; 
however, the government will be able to exert influence on the distribution of funds.  
The next initiative in the Grant Model is the SBIR program.  Many readers may 
be confused about the inclusion of SBIR in a discussion about VC.  However, readers 
should realize that commercialization occurs in Phase III of the SBIR program.  During 
Phase III, private-sector investors are able to support the technology and bring it to the 
market.  Often, this phase deals with VC.  In fact, a study was conducted at Harvard 
University in 1996 that concluded “that the SBIR program has had a positive long run 
impact in areas where venture capital is available” (Cooper, 2003, p. 140).  This positive 
impact is because SBIR fills a specific gap; the study explains that “gap is at the seed and 
start-up stages where many new ventures must rely on their own money or on personal 
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contacts, and before the project has developed to the point that an angel or venture 
capitalist is interested” (Cooper, 2003, p. 140).  As Lerner points out, the SBIR program 
is a public venture capital program because it fills the need for financing where the 
private market has not adequately funded an innovative activity (Cooper, 2003).  The 
SBIR program is a perfect example of the Grant Model.  While SBIR is a significant 
source of funding for early-stage small businesses (Harcum, 2003), federal agencies 
select the focus areas for SBIR that support public program goals (Cooper, 2003).   
The Army uses a different mechanism to further its public program goals—the 
Applied Communication Information Networking (ACIN) program.  The ACIN Camden 
Center for Entrepreneurship in Technology fosters “growth in private-sector companies 
that are developing new technologies and products to be used in military and commercial 
applications” by serving as “a full-service technology accelerator program designed to 
assist small companies” (ACIN, 2007).  How does ACIN foster growth?  What is a full-
service technology accelerator program?  The ACIN program is an incubator for small 
companies.  As an incubator, ACIN fosters growth: by providing a plug-and-play 
environment where small businesses have access to office and communications 
equipment; by offering mentoring, coaching, and management expertise to support small 
businesses’ strategy, intellectual property management, and marketing; and by 
surrounding the small businesses with knowledge from other defense contractors (ACIN, 
2007).  The hope is that all of these services will “accelerate the formation and growth of 
early stage technology ventures” (ACIN, 2007) that might mature, commercialize, and 
have capability desired by the Army.  ACIN had 900 incubator contractors as of 2005.  
These contracts are simple: “Companies get office space and entrepreneurial advice, 
while the military gets a first look at whatever technology emerges,” and “successful 
research programs are transitioned to small businesses for production” (Deitch, 2005, 
p.19). 
3. Communication Catalyst Model 
Communication Catalysts do not provide any funding to the commercial sector.  
The purpose of the Communication Catalyst Model is to establish and support 
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communication forums for the VC and the government’s acquisition communities.  
government funding supports the organic resources of its agencies to support these 
efforts.  However, Communication Catalysts facilitate a “meeting of the minds” between 
venture capitalists, the commercial sector, and the government’s acquisition community.  
Successful technology transition is dependent on the government’s acquisition 
community successfully budgeting for these technologies.  The Navy’s CTTO and its 
VCs @ Sea program (as well as DeVenCI) are Communication Catalysts. 
The mission of the Navy’s CTTO, according to its website, is to rapidly transition 
the best technologies from any source into Department of the Navy programs (Office of 
Naval Research, 2007).  The CTTO’s process for transitioning these technologies is 
effectively to be a “matchmaker” or “deal broker” between industry and Naval 
Acquisition Programs.  This process is depicted in Figure 14 below.  Clearly, the CTTO 
is a Communication Catalyst—as evidenced by the fact that the organization brings 
together VCs and warfighters in order to enhance information and identify potential areas 
of shared value—a proving ground and customer for the VCs and improved capability for 
the warfighter (Lawlor, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 14.   CTTO Process [From ONR website, 2005] 
 
In addition to being a “deal broker,” the CTTO sponsors the Naval Research 
Advisory Committee (NRAC) Venture Capital Technology Panel.  In its roadmap 
process, the panel developed an intriguing method to identify emerging technologies—
the VCs @ Sea program. 
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The first instance of the VCs @ Sea program occurred from January 19 to 21, 
2003, off the California coast.  The CTTO granted leading venture capitalists access to 
aircraft carrier and fleet operations during Exercise Transparent Hunter.  The VCs 
explored the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and the Third Fleet's flagship USS Coronado to 
understand the Navy’s technology operations and needs (ONR, 2003).   
The VCs @ Sea program was operated as one of the CTTO’s "venture 
initiatives.”  There is no equity investment or grant funding.  While the overall goal of the 
CTTO is to bring VCs and warfighters together, the VCs @ Sea initiative made this goal 
a reality by establishing a forum for VCs and warfighters to brainstorm together and learn 
to speak a common language.  (ONR, 2003)  Unfortunately, the VCs @ Sea program has 
been discontinued due to budget constraints, but the Communication Catalyst Model had 
a lasting impact, which can now be found in the Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative.   
DeVenCI is the latest VC initiative and has a very similar goal to the CTTO’s 
mission.  DeVenCI focuses on emerging technologies and uses various methods to 
increase awareness within the DoD of these emerging technologies.  (Defense Venture 
Catalyst Initiative, 2007)  DeVenCI structured itself similarly to the CTTO-to “broker” 
information exchanges between the DoD and small, innovative companies (DeVenCI, 
2007).  The purpose of brokering is to identify emerging technologies that meet a current 
warfighter need.  The DeVenCI Model is depicted in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15.   The DeVenCI Model [From DeVenCI, 2007] 
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DeVenCI does not provide any direct funding to the VC industry. According to 
DeVenCI, the initiative is a catalyst for improved communication between warfighters 
and small, innovative companies.  (DeVenCI, 2007)  DeVenCI is supported by 11 
venture capitalists that volunteer to help foster communication and collaboration.  The 
VCs volunteer their time and knowledge in order to improve the government’s ability to 
interact with these small, innovative companies.  (DeVenCI, 2007).  Communication 
forums are created by an offering of workshops, technology expositions, industry 
outreach, and web access. 
The range of initiatives along the spectrum displays the many different 
approaches for facilitating the exchange of information between the VC industry and the 
government to enhance R&D.  The next section, which will provide quantitative data on 
the Government VC initiatives’ activities, provides a similar breakdown as the VC.  This 
data will answer the research questions about the investment trends of the Government 
VC initiatives.     
D. VC PORTFOLIO  
We assess the VC portfolio according to similar areas defined in the VC industry 
by: resources, investments, companies, exits, and performance.  These areas include the  
Government VC initiatives broken down by the spectrum: Equity Investment, Grant, or 
Communication Catalyst.  The portfolio includes all the organizations along the spectrum 
defined in the previous section. This section will try to compile the various  Government 
VC initiatives into one portfolio to get a macro-view for further analysis.  
1. VC Initiative Resources  
The Government VC initiatives have different sources of funding from various 
government agencies.  The use of the government funds depends on where the VC 
initiative lies along the spectrum.  Most of the Government VC initiatives have their main 
office in Northern Virginia, but have affiliated organizations spread across the U.S..  We 
will first assess the Equity Investment Models.      
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a. Equity Investment Model 
OnPoint and In-Q-Tel are the Government VC initiatives in current 
operation that make equity investments.  Since its inception in 2002, Onpoint had 
received $61.8 million as of May 2006 (Palmer, 2006).  On the other hand the CIA 
provides investment capital to In-Q-Tel with an annual contract between $30 and $37 
million (Lerner, Hardymon, Book, & Leamon, 2004).  However, according to Lacy 
(2005), In-Q-Tel’s annual budget increased from about $27 million to $60 million with 
new funds from other agencies within the intelligence community, such as the National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).  With these dollar amounts, we can estimate the 
total capital under management since the organization’s inception. 
The total capital under management for OnPoint is about $61.8 million 
since it opened for business in 2003 (Palmer, 2006).  On average, OnPoint’s capital under 
management per year was about $12.36 million.  In-Q-Tel’s total capital under 
management is about $360 million since its inception in 1999.  This amount is estimated 
using $30 million from 1999 to 2004 and $60 million from 2005 to 2007 based on the 
estimates by Lerner et al. (2004) and Lacy (2005).  On average, In-Q-Tel’s capital under 
management per year was about $40 million.  The government provided about $421.8 
million in total capital for investment for OnPoint and In-Q-Tel throughout 1999 to 2007.  
In addition to analyzing the capital under management, we can assess these Government 
VC initiatives according to their geographic locations.     
OnPoint is located in Winter Park, Florida, and its creator, MilCom 
Technologies, is also located in Florida.  In-Q-Tel’s main office is in Arlington, Virginia, 
but it has another office in Menlo Park, California.  The office in California houses In-Q-
Tel’s strategic investment team, which operates similar to a corporate strategic venture 
capital firm (In-Q-Tel, 2007).  The next category, the Grant Model, will assess the 




b. Grant Model  
SBIR receives funds from various government agencies, but we will only 
assess the DoD’s SBIR program.  The NTA RTVG receives funds from NGA, which is 
the executive agency for the NTA.  ACIN receives funds from the Army through a 
partnership with Drexel University.  In 2006, the DoD’s SBIR budget totaled 
$1,133,774,407 (DoD SBIR, 2007).  The following figure breaks down these figures by 












Figure 16.   SBIR Budget for 2006 [From SBIR, 2007] 
 
In 2006, according to the DoD’s Annual Report on Cooperative 
Agreements and Other Transactions, the NTA RTVG was awarded $13,218,365, while 
ACIN was awarded $20 million for three years.  The NTA RTVG received awards for 
various acquisition transactions for prototype (DoD, 2007).  Back in February 2002, the 
NTA RTVG received a contract for five years worth up to $200 million from NGA 
(Caterinicchia, 2002).  In 2006, the DoD’s SBIR, the NTA RTVG, and ACIN had 
$1,166,992,772 in total funds under their management.    
SBIR offices for the DoD are located in Arlington, VA.  The NTA 
RTVG’s main office is also located in Northern Virginia.  However, the NTA RTVG’s 
















companies with facilities in 34 states and across the globe (Rosettex, 2004).  Even though 
the main office for DoD SBIR programs is in Northern Virginia, personnel there examine 
proposals from across the nation.  The ACIN technology center is located at the 
Waterfront Technology Center in Camden, NJ, but it also has strong relationships with 
Drexel University, Rutgers University, University of Pennsylvania, Rowan University 
and other academic institutions.  This relationship provides access to intellectual capital, 
including professors, researchers, and students in technology, engineering, and 
management (ACIN, 2007).  The last category assessed for the Government VC resource 
area is the Communication Catalyst Model. 
c. Communication Catalyst Model 
DeVenCI receives funds from the DoD to run its office.  DeVenCI’s 
budget for 2007 was about $3 million (Lais, 2007).  According to the Office of the 
Secretary Defense’s RDT&E project justification from February 2007, DeVenCI’s 
proposed budget for FY 2008 is $3.9 million, increasing up to $4.7 million for FY 2009.  
DeVenCI’s funds are used mostly for its workshops, which bring the DoD’s acquisition 
community together with innovative companies found by the VC Industry (Lais, 2007).  
DeVenCI consists of a small team located in Northern Virginia.  However, 
it employs 11 consultants from the VC Industry in various parts of the country.  These 
VC consultants are experts in their fields and have first-hand knowledge of new emerging 
technologies in the private sector.   This assessment on VC resources provides a 
necessary foundation for the assessment on Government VC initiatives’ investments to 
follow. 
2. VC Initiative Investments 
We will breakdown the investments for the Government VC initiatives by their 
associated industry sector and funding stage or phase.  The categories for the different 
stages are startup-seed, early, expansion, and latter.  These stages will be used in the next 
section to describe the investments made by Government VC initiatives under Equity  
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Investment Model. This section also includes a breakdown of the average age of the 
companies, as well as their investments and the geographic concentration of these 
investments.  
a. Equity Investment Model 
In-Q-Tel’s investments focus around three areas: software, infrastructure, 
and physical sciences (In-Q-Tel, 2007).  These areas are related to the following industry 
sectors: computer software, computer hardware and services, semiconductors and 
electronics, biotechnology, communications, and industrial/energy.  OnPoint’s main 
investment focus areas are mobile power and energy-enabling technologies, which both 
fall under the industrial/energy sector (OnPoint, 2007).  In-Q-Tel does not concentrate on 
any one particular stage, but its track record has shown investments in startup-seed and 
early-stage companies (Tighe, 2007).  OnPoint also does not concentrate on a particular 
stage because its strategic focus allows it to invest at any stage of development (Cox & 
McGee, 2005).  
In 2004, In-Q-Tel averaged a deal about every other week—ranging from 
$500,000 to $3 million.  From 1999 to 2005, In-Q-Tel invested in 77 transactions 
averaging almost 13 investments per year (Lacy, 2005).  OnPoint’s typical investments 
range from $500,000 to $2.5 million, and it makes between four to six investments each 
year (Cox & McGee, 2005).  Both OnPoint and In-Q-Tel either lead investment rounds or 
co-invest with other firms.  The following figures show the investments’ geographic 
concentration and the average age of the invested companies.  The figures are derived 
using data from In-Q-Tel and OnPoint’s website.  There was no data for the age of 
OnPoint’s invested companies.  However, OnPoint started operations in 2003; so at most, 





CA 25 42% MD 1 2%
CO 4 7% MN 2 3%
CT 1 2% NC 1 2%
FL 1 2% NM 1 2%
GA 1 2% NV 1 2%
ID 1 2% OR 2 3%
IL 1 2% RI 1 2%
MA 7 12% VA 8 13%
MI 1 2% Canada 1 2%
      Total 60 100%






Figure 18.   OnPoint Investment % by Geographic Location 
 
In-Q-Tel   






Private (invested in)  50 36 3.0
Public (invested in)  2 48 4.0
Acquired   6 31 2.6
  (date invested to date acquired)   
Private (Strategic Partnerships) 2 41 3.4
  Total 60   
Figure 19.   In-Q-Tel: Average Age of Portfolio Companies as of August 2007 
b. Grant Model 
The NTA RTVG, ACIN, and the DoD’s SBIR focus their funds or 
resources mostly in the information technology sector.  The NTA RTVG focuses on 
geospatial intelligence (GI) technology, information processing, analysis and 
management (IPAM) technology, digital technology infrastructure (DTI), and 






  10 100%
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resources for areas such as voice-over IP (VoIP) tracebook, modeling and simulation, 
high-power amplifiers, and intelligent agent feasibility for future tactical networks 
(ACIN, 2007).  The DoD’s SBIR focuses on areas such as ultra-wideband imaging array 
surveillance sensors, caching software updates over a wide-area network, and cognitive 
radio capability for software-defined radios (DoD SBIR, 2007). 
The DoD’s SBIR funds are capped at $100,000 for phase one and 
$750,000 for phase two.  The following figures break down the total awards funded for 
each phase in 2006 and the top five states receiving DoD SBIR from 2001 to 2004: 
 
DoD 
Component # Topics 
# Ph I 
proposals 
# Ph I 
awards 
# Ph II 
awards 
Army 238 3,384 352 390 
Navy 187 2,498 446 232 
Air Force 285 4,275 577 312 
DARPA 23 427 25 48 
DTRA 13 127 23 17 
MDA 54 1,165 174 119 
SOCOM 17 266 49 5 
CBD 10 149 17 9 
OSD 55 955 197 39 
NGA 1 7 2 1 
All DoD 883 13,253 1,862 1,172 
Figure 20.   DoD SBIR Phase I & II Awards, 2006 




Figure 21.   DoD SBIR Phase I Awards by Geographic Location,  
2001 to 2004 




ACIN and the NTA RTVG’s funds are not separated into different phases 
as they are with SBIR.  ACIN is a technology incubator that provides resources instead of 
funds to startup companies.  The NTA’s funds go directly to RTVG, which invests any 
profits from management and development into an independent venture fund (Deitch, 
2004).  This independent venture fund provides startup-seed and early-stage investments 
(Rosettex, 2004).   
c. Communication Catalyst Model 
DeVenCI’s main focus area is in the information technology sector.  
Within this sector, DeVenCI is interested in areas such as identity management, 
information assurance, network operations, data sharing, network components, and 
systems architecture (DeVenCI, 2007).  DeVenCI examines all companies from startup-
seed to later stage.  The initiative does not make investments in any companies.  The next 
section will list the actual companies, universities, or laboratories that compose the 
Government VC portfolio. 
3. VC Initiative Portfolio Companies 
The Government VC initiatives have a diverse portfolio of companies with which 
they each work with.  The majority of the companies are small, largely unknown 
companies.  These companies were unknown to the government prior to the VC 
initiatives.  Some portfolios are bigger than others, so we will not list all the companies 
for the larger portfolios.  The next section covers the VC initiative companies under the 
Equity Investment Model. 
a. Equity Investment Model  
In-Q-Tel’s portfolio contains about 60 emerging companies and three 
innovative partnerships with established companies, public and private laboratories, and 
universities (In-Q-Tel, 2007).  OnPoint, in contrast to In-Q-Tel, only has 10 companies in 
its portfolio (OnPoint, 2007).  The difference can be due to the age of the firm, 




• Pixim: Develops imaging platform that produces higher quality moving and still 
images.  www.pixim.com 
• Infobionics: The Cellular Database Management System™ that delivers an 
unprecedented combination of flexibility and performance data search and 
analysis. www.infobionics.com 
• TenXsys: Specializes in remote monitoring of health and location for humans and 
animals. www.tenxsys.com 
• Initiate Systems: Specializes in entity resolution and information sharing about 
persons, organizations, objects, and events. www.initiatesystems.com 
• Adaptive Energy: Is the leading innovator of miniature piezo actuators and 
generators.  www.adaptiveenergy.com 
 
Note 1: The companies listed above are the most recent investments. 
Note 2: See Appendix A for complete list of In-Q-Tel’s portfolio companies. 
 
OnPoint 
• Nanosolar: Developers thin-film solar technology for roll-to-roll printing of solar 
cells on flexible substrates.  www.nanosolar.com 
• PowerGenix: Develops next-generation rechargeable batteries.  
www.powergenixsystems.com 
• UltraCell: Develops and sells integrated fuel cell systems.  
www.ultracellpower.com 
• Zinc Matrix Power: Develops high-performance, rechargeable alkaline battery 
technology for commercial and military market.  www.zmp.com 
• Superprotonic: Is an energy technology company that markets and 
commercializes the innovative solid acid fuel cell technology developed and 
patented by the company's founders at the California Institute of Technology.  
www.superprotonic.com 
• A123: Develops advanced Lithium-ion-based cells for rechargeable battery packs. 
www.a123systems.com 
• Integrated Fuel Cell Technologies, Inc.: Develops next-generation fuel cell 
systems; will address the global fuel cell market for portable devices. 
• Akermin: Develops and commercializes portable fuel cells based on its 
proprietary "Stabilized Enzyme Biofuel Cell" technology.  www.akermin.com 
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• PowerPrecise: Is a Fabless semiconductor company specializing in battery 
management devices. 
• Atraverda: Develops advanced bi-polar battery electrodes for rechargeable 
batteries.  www.atraverda.com 
b. Grant Model 
The DoD’s SBIR portfolio includes 1,862 companies that received Phase-I 
funds and 1,172 companies that received Phase-II funds in 2006 (DoD SBIR, 2007).    
The NTA RTVG  manages a team of more than 75 leading information technology 
organizations (Rosettex, 2004).  This team can be viewed as companies in the NTA 
RTVG’s portfolio.  ACIN’s portfolio consists of 36 companies that utilize ACIN’s full-
service, emerging technology incubator/accelerator program (ACIN, 2007).  The list 
below only contains a few companies due to the large size of these portfolios.      
SBIR 
• Nanosonic, Inc.: Demonstrates improvements to broadband transmissions by 
targeting desired waveband and optical transmission specification. 
• Anza Corp.: Develops satellite optical communications modules. 
• Microcosm, Inc.: Provides generic adaptive approaches for orbit and attitude 
determination on earth-pointing spacecraft. 
• Fiber Materials, Inc.: Develops advanced, low-cost, non-eroding material 
systems based on carbon filter reinforced with carbon silicon carbide for high 
performance divert and attitude control system components. 
• Razor Technologies, Inc.: Develops and demonstrates a total hypergolic 
propellant leak detection system.  
 
NTA RTVG 
• Ashland Institute: Offers independent needs analysis outreach, technology 
assessment and evaluation 
• SYNTEK Technologies: Offers independent needs analysis outreach, technology 
assessment and evaluation 
• Purdue University: Provides technology research, development and prototyping 
• Motorola: Provides technology research, development and prototyping 
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• HP Invent: Specializes in product development and commercialization 
• InPhase Technologies: Specializes in product development and 
commercialization 
• Lockheed Martin Corporation: Specializes in technology Insertion and System 
Integration 
• IBM Consulting: Specializes in technology Insertion and System Integration 
 




• Gestalt, LLC: Develops practical, yet innovative solutions that drive competitive 
advantage in complex decision environments. 
• USFalcon: Service-disabled, veteran-owned, minority business enterprise that 
offers information technology solutions, operations and logistics solutions, 
professional engineering solutions, security and intelligence solutions, and 
business analytical services. 
• Smarter Agent: Combines mobile location technology, such as GPS, with 
information about real estate, neighborhoods, and interesting places. 
• Iridian Technologies: Leads the world in research, development and marketing 
of authentication technologies based on iris recognition—the most accurate 
biometric identifier. 
• ENI Systems: Offers smart-card and biometric solutions for physical access, 
public key infrastructure, and custom software solutions.  
 
Note 1: See Appendix A for a complete list of ACIN’s portfolio companies. 
c. Communication Catalyst Model 
DeVenCI does not have a portfolio of invested companies, but its portfolio 
consists of 11 private VC consultants.  The list below contains the selected private VC 
consultants with their respective VC firms for 2006. 
• Mr. Tom Banahan (Lehman Brothers Venture Partners) 
• Dr. James Barrett (New Enterprise Associates) 
• Mr. Kevin Fong (Mayfield Fund) 
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• Mr. Wilber James (RockPort Capital Partners) 
• Mr. Mark Kvamme (Sequoia Capital) 
• Mr. Jeb Miller (ComVentures) 
• Mr. Roger Novak (Novak Biddle Venture Partners) 
• Mr. Don Rainey (Intersouth Partners) 
• Mr. Morgan Rodd (Arrowpath Venture Partners) 
• Mr. Ted Schlein (Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers) 
• Mr. Robert Simon (Alta Partners) 
 
The portfolios for each Government VC initiative are unique and do not only include 
equity-investment companies, but also include strategic partnerships, private VC 
consultants, universities, established public companies, and public and private 
laboratories.  Some companies in the Government VC portfolio have either gone public 
or been acquired by other public companies; this trend is discussed further in the next 
section.  
4. Exits (IPOs and Acquisitions) 
The Government VC initiatives’ goal is not financial returns. Thus, company exits 
through IPO or acquisition is not important.  However, some initiatives’ returns on 
investments go toward future projects, operations, or an employee investment plan.  The 
only Government VC initiatives that are directly involved with IPOs or acquisition are 
In-Q-Tel and OnPoint, due to their equity investment.    
The 10 companies in OnPoint’s portfolio are still private, and there is no 
information regarding any acquisition of OnPoint’s invested companies.  However, some 
of In-Q-Tel’s invested companies were acquired or achieved IPO.  This section only 
assesses the exits involved with In-Q-Tel because the Government VC initiatives under 
the Grant and Communication Catalyst Models are not directly involved with IPOs or 
acquisitions. 
 47
We found that two companies achieved IPO; six of In-Q-Tel’s invested 
companies were acquired.  This record dates from the inception of In-Q-Tel in 1999.  
Another company in In-Q-Tel’s portfolio is also planning to file for IPO:  3VR Security 
CEO and co-founder, Stephen Russell, announced 3VR may file for an IPO in less than 
two years (Bak, 2007).  The figure below describes each IPO and acquisition with 



















liquidated in March 
2005) Oct-03 Apr-04  $     3.45 
725,000 
(see 
Note A) 0.69 N/A 
Electro Energy Mar-04 Apr-05  $     0.68 
118,066 
(see 
Note B) $3.11  N/A 
Acquisition             
Decru Oct-03 Jan-05 N/A N/A N/A 
Network 
Appliance 
Keyhole Feb-03 Oct-04 N/A N/A N/A Google 
Soflinx Mar-03 Dec-04 N/A N/A N/A 
Lockheed 
Martin 
@ Last Software Jul-04 Mar-06 N/A N/A N/A Google 
SRD Jan-01 Jan-05 N/A N/A N/A IBM 
Visual Sciences Mar-04 Dec-05 N/A N/A N/A 
WebSide 
Story 
       
Notes:       
A-Original agreement was for In-Q-Tel to pay $500,000 for about 1.03 million shares, but In-Q-Tel 
     decided to liquidate and agreed to 725,000 shares (75% held by company and 25% to employee 
      fund) and liquidated its stake in March 2005 at about $10 per share (Byron, 2005).  
B-The 118,066 is split between 90,632 shares of unregistered common stock and 27,434 warrants  
    for the $300,000 received from In-Q-Tel in connection with original stock purchase agreement.  The 
    original stock purchase agreement was for 241,692 shares of unregistered common stock and warrants 
    to purchase 75,829 shares of unregistered common stock at $3.11 per share.  Total purchase price 
    is $800,000, expected to be paid over 14 months following the closing (SEC, 2007). 






5. VC Initiative Performance 
Performance for Government VC initiatives is not measured by financial returns 
as it is for the VC industry.  Government VC initiatives’ performance is based on both 
tangible and intangible items.  A tangible item is the return on technology or new 
innovative technology that is successfully transferred into the government.  Intangible 
items are the social networks created with the VC industry and new emerging innovative 
companies.  Most initiatives are too young for their return on technology to be accurately 
measured, but there are signs of success.  However, the social network is just as 
important because without it, the government is back to conducting closed innovation.  
We assess the Government VC initiatives’ performance, beginning with the Equity 
Investment Model.   
a. Equity Investment Model 
In-Q-Tel and Onpoint’s funds leverage $8 from the private sector for 
every $1 they invest (Palmer, 2006).  This leverage helps them lower both development 
costs and total lifecycle costs (Cotell, 2006).  OnPoint opened for business in 2003, and it 
already has one key success.  One of OnPoint’s companies, PowerPrecise Solutions, 
developed a low-cost, state-of-charge-indicator for the BA-5590 primary, non-
rechargeable battery.  The Army fielded 10,000 units of this new technology within two 
years, and OnPoint expected more than 100,000 fielded units by the end of FY 2006.  
According to the Army Audit Agency Report, the projected cost savings on this new 
technology’s was over $375 million for the entire DoD (Rottenberg, 2006).  In-Q-Tel’s 
performance speaks for itself. 
According to In-Q-Tel’s website, it has delivered more than 140 
technology solutions, engaged with more than 90 companies (previously unknown to the 
government) and more than 10 universities and research labs.  In-Q-Tel reviewed more 
than 6,000 business plans, and its social network consists of more than 200 VC firms and 
100 labs and research organizations (In-Q-Tel, 2007). In addition to its return on 
technology and social network, In-Q-Tel’s return on investment allowed it to reinvest 
about $15 million in future projects (Cotell, 2006).  
 49
An example of In-Q-Tel’s return on investment was Ionatron’s move to go 
public in 2004.  Ionatron sold In-Q-Tel a warrant to buy $500,000 worth of stock for less 
than one dollar per share.  In-Q-Tel sold its stake in Ionatron in 2005 for more than $5 
million, according to SEC filings.  In-Q-Tel was criticized for a “pump-and-dump” 
scheme; however, In-Q-Tel’s relationship with Ionatron ended a year before the stock 
was sold.  The profits went towards future investments, an employee investment plan 
(independent of In-Q-Tel and benchmarked to industry average), and a donation to the 
CIA Officers’ Memorial Foundation (O’Hara, 2005).  
In-Q-Tel also made a return on investment when it sold 5,636 shares of 
Google, worth over $2.2 million on November 15, 2005.  The stocks were a result of 
Google’s acquisition of Keyhole from In-Q-Tel (Hoover, 2006).  According to Louie 
(2007), In-Q-Tel turned a $50,000 investment in Keyhole into $5 million.  In-Q-Tel’s 
equity investment is only about 20% of the total funds given to each company it invests 
in to obtain warrants (rights to buy stocks at a certain price).  The other 80% is used for 
buying licenses, technology modifications for government use, and to fund future 
technology development.  In-Q-Tel is able to obtain warrants at a low price while the 
company claims 80% of In-Q-Tel’s funds as revenue.  At the beginning of 2006, In-Q-
Tel had an internal rate of return (IRR) around 26-27% from only its equity portion of the 
investments.  This IRR placed In-Q-Tel among the top 10% of all VC funds. (Louie, 
2007)         
b. Grant Model 
The DoD SBIR’s performance can be measured either by the success 
stories or whether the program is meeting SBIR guidelines.  For example, SBIR-related 
products account for about 25% of II-VI Inc.’s revenues that currently exceed $60 million 
(DoD SBIR, 2007).  However, SBIR’s performance can not be solely measured on 
success stories.  SBIR has guidelines to meet; the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) conducted a report on DoD’s SBIR in April 2006.   
The GAO report found most of the awards were concentrated in a few 
states.  California and Massachusetts received about a third of all SBIR awards and total 
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dollars awarded.  About 12% of DoD SBIR awards exceeded guidelines and accounted 
for 23% of the dollars awarded by the DoD.  The additional amount was either used to 
ensure higher-quality investigations or included non-SBIR funds, such as mission funds.   
Half of the firms that received DoD SBIR awards had 20 employees or 
less, but firms that also received venture capital investment were about 30% larger.  The 
GAO also found that the DoD awarded a higher amount for Phase I to companies with 
venture capital investments.  However, only 7% of total dollars awarded (or $218 
million) went to companies with venture capital investment.  ACIN is the next 
organization we assess as a Government VC Grant. 
ACIN’s performance can be measured by its social network—that 
includes international participation from New Zealand and Israel Technology and their 
mentoring partners: General Dynamics, CACI, Verizon FNS, Galaxy Scientific, Lucent, 
Lockheed, and Booz Allen.  Another measure of ACIN’s performance is by government 
contracts awarded to small businesses in its portfolio.  For example, Gestalt Corp 
received a $53.3 million defense grant in April 2006.  Gestalt’s CEO hoped to produce 
and field test a product to protect against improvised explosive devices within 90 days.  
USfalcon is another company associated with ACIN that received an award (along with 
six other prime contractors) for $19.25 billion over 10 years to support the Strategic 
Services Sourcing Program.  The NTA RTVG is the last organization to assess before we 
assess the performance of  Government VC initiatives that fall under the Communication 
Catalyst Model (ACIN, 2004). 
In 2004, the NTA RTVG had 35 orders in less than two years—with a 
value of approximately $43 million (Deitch, 2004).  We can also measure the NTA 
RTVG’s performance based on the government awards received.  In 2006, according to 
the DoD’s Annual Report on Cooperative Agreements and Other Transactions, the NTA 
RTVG received 17 awards totaling $13,218,365.  The NTA RTVG’s social network with 
the 75 leading information technology organizations is a significant, though intangible, 
measure of the NTA RTVG’s performance.   
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c. Communication Catalyst Model 
DeVenCI is another young organization, so it is too early to measure its 
performance based on technology transitioned into the DoD.  However, DeVenCI has a 
powerful social network consisting of 11 venture capitalists from the private industry.  
These 11 venture capitalists typically find 30 companies within six weeks to present to 
the DoD’s acquisition community.  These are companies with break-through technology 
unknown to the DoD.  However, DeVenCI also introduces well-known companies (such 
as Google) that have never worked with the DoD.  Google personnel taught several 
agencies about the Google search engine (Lais, 2007).  As previously mentioned, 
intangible items such as social networks are just as important as returns on technology or 
investment in measuring performance.  The assessment of the VC industry and 
Government VC initiatives, though obviously not conclusive, does solve more of our 
research questions .  This leads into our next chapter on the QDR—an investigation of 
whether or not the Government VC initiatives are investing in the areas addressed in the 
QDR.  
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IV. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW OF QDR  
A chapter dedicated to the QDR in the context of VC may seem unexpected in 
this discussion, but simple qualitative analysis of the QDR suggests VC could be ideal for 
defense modernization.  First, what about the QDR makes it important for VC?   The 
QDR could be considered the archetypal public document which enumerates the “gaps” 
between current and desired defense capability.  Title 10 USC 118 specifies the Secretary 
of Defense must perform a periodic review to include a:  
National defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, 
infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and 
policies of the United States with a view toward determining and 
expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a 
defense program for the next 20 years. (Title 10 USC 118)   
The QDR, as a public document, ideally positions those capability gaps for the 
VC community’s consideration.  That is, VC entities and entrepreneurs alike can align 
their interests to a very solvent customer: the DoD.  The VC community thrives off of 
networking and partnering to allocate funding and find viable entrepreneurial candidates.  
“Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather 
than arm's-length, spot market transactions” (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007, p. 251).  
The NVCA Yearbook’s charts and tables suggest information technology (IT) and medical 
innovation are arguably the two most prominent areas of VC investment (2007a).  VCs 
can certainly help here, but the QDR specifies more areas than IT and medical needs.  
The DoD can harness the power of the VC industry’s infrastructure to narrow its 
capability gaps.  Moreover, the DoD can probably close these gaps in a more expedient, 
economical fashion than can traditional R&D agencies.   
Finding the QDR-defined capability gaps required the researchers to filter the 
entire document to extract relevant portions containing implications for DoD needs on the  
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VC industry.  What exactly are the criteria for a “relevant” portion of the QDR?  Here is 
an explanation of the criteria we used, with an actual excerpt from the 2006 QDR as an 
example of each: 
1. Specific dollar amounts for future investment. 
a. EXAMPLE:  The Department is further increasing funding for the 
Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) by an additional $2.1 
billion (p. 51). 
2. Declared areas of increased investment, even if a dollar amount is not stated. 
a. EXAMPLE: Make additional investments in information assurance 
capabilities to protect information and the Department’s computer 
networks (p.50). 
3. Generalizations about future capabilities.   
a. EXAMPLE: Capabilities to locate, tag, and track terrorists in all 
domains, including cyberspace (p. 52).  
4. Reformations, modernizations, paradigm shifts, and DoD internal studies. 
a. EXAMPLE: From an emphasis on ships, guns, tanks and planes—to 
focus on information, knowledge and timely, actionable intelligence.  
From massing forces—to massing effects (p. vii).  
 
After condensing these portions from the QDR, we identified commonalities in the 
investment recommendations, capabilities studies, and reformation initiatives.  We then 
grouped similar items together.  Finally, we organized the groups into an outline, 
presented here:  
I. DoD Overall Goals 
II. Key portfolio areas: 
a. Information Technology 
b. Medical/Biological 
c. Intel & Surveillance 
d. Language & Cultural skills 
e. Logistics 
III. Result—Cost Minimization and Innovation 
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For the purpose of efficiency, the QDR sentences and phrases are located in Appendix B.  
Below, we summarize the conglomeration of what we found in the document itself. 
1. DoD Overall Goals 
At several points, the QDR suggests that the DoD must increasingly use 
innovation to achieve its vision for the next 10 to 20 years.  The theme will not be 
“business as usual.”  The DoD emphasizes the need to be light and lean today, while 
anticipating future capabilities and acquiring them early.  The Department’s turning to 
VC will arguably result in earlier acquisition of these missing capabilities.  Venture 
capitalists have a vested interest in prodding their entrepreneurs to deliver what is 
promised in their business plan.  Of course, one of VC’s hallmarks is urging 
entrepreneurs to make progress so investors may exit an investment.  The DoD is not 
pursuing just the financial reward of VC, but also the potential for increased capability to 
put systems in the warfighters’ hands.   
2. Information Technology 
We identified nine references in the QDR pertaining to enhanced IT capabilities.  
Specific references are detailed in Appendix A; however, we identified aggregate needs 
in the following areas: network protection, communication, information protection, and 
cyber-warfare.  For network protection, the DoD needs to “defend and protect 
information and networks” (p. 59).   The QDR makes several references to the 
importance of real-time information-sharing among the joint and international forces.  
Other key areas in which VC could provide a capability include: protecting information 
systems from electromagnetic pulse, augmenting the Global Information Grid (GIG), 
developing software to locate, tag, and track terrorists, and securing broadband 
communications.  The QDR specifies several IT needs for the future; serendipitously for 





We identified six references in the QDR pertaining to enhanced 
medical/biological capabilities.   Of the six references, five specifically called for medical 
countermeasures against biological agents, pathogens, and viruses.  Rosenburg suggests 
this heavy investment in countermeasures is necessary and worthwhile.  “Not to develop 
defenses against conceivable biological and chemical weapons […] entails risk […] no 
defense against biological and chemical weapons can be fully satisfactory” (1985, p. 
120).  Evidently, in the spirit of Rosenburg’s quote, the DoD believes in moving 
forward—it is dedicating $1.5B for medical countermeasures over the next five years.   
4. Intelligence and Surveillance 
We found eight references concerning intelligence and surveillance matters.  The 
QDR discusses these in vague terms, with no specific dollar amounts mentioned.  
Capabilities defined here include:  information fusion, synthetic aperture radar 
capabilities, and rapid data/rapid reaction, an “unblinking eye” over battlespace, and air 
/maritime domain awareness.  Tomorrow’s focus is on real-time data, which is easily 
common among forces in the field; this leads to a coordinated attack on the enemy.  That 
is, “good” intelligence only has value for a short time, and the warfighter must have the 
capability to receive that information and exploit it as soon as possible.   
5. Language and Cultural Skills 
We found two QDR references emphasizing the importance of investing in 
language and cultural skills.   The most significant factor impacting language and cultural 
skills is the changeover from the Cold War to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).   
Lt. Col. Deborah Hanagan, the Chief of Staff of the Defense Language Institute Foreign 
Language Center (DLIFLC), said, “Our military missions are so different today than they 
were during the Cold War, when Russian and other East European languages were our 
largest programs” (Cutter, 2007, ¶ 3).  The current Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts caused 
a surge in demand for Arabic, Dari, and Pashto.  Entrepreneurs have many opportunities 
to create dual-use technologies to hasten the learning process.  At the DFIFLC, 
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technology plays a big role in the classroom because the younger generations are used to 
having access to information at their fingertips.  Classrooms have interactive white 
boards; educators issue students MP3 players or iPods, and are proving them with tablet 
PCs (Cutter, 2007).  Language and cultural learning technologies may not win the Nobel 
Prize like medical breakthroughs, but they will enable the DoD to accomplish its mission.   
6. Logistics 
We found only one quote about logistics.  It emphasizes the DoD should pursue 
enabling technologies for transformational logistics and innovative operations such as 
seabasing.  
7. Cost Minimization and Innovation 
We found six QDR references suggesting a desired end-state for the technological 
breakthroughs in information technology, medical/biological, intelligence/surveillance, 
language/cultural skills, and logistics.  From these “end-state” quotes, we distilled two 
main results: 1) cost minimization and 2) innovation.  Even though the DoD is doing 
everything in its power to make it as unfair a fight as possible for its enemies, it still must 
operate with a finite budget.  This is a challenge when the DoD’s list of responsibilities 
seems to keep expanding, and the enemy keeps getting smarter.  Simultaneously, the 
DoD must invest billions in research and development—which might be fruitless—and 
find more innovative ways to get its job done.    
We analyze the data we collected in the next section.  Specifically, we: 1) 
determine differences, as well as the advantages and disadvantages, of the various 
Government VC initiatives, 2) compare and contrast the investment portfolios of the VC 
industry vs. the Government VC initiatives, and 3) determine if the VC industry provides 









The research for this project yielded potential arguments against the various DoD 
VC models.  This paper does not adequately deal with all of these arguments, but it is 
important to recognize the objections and potential challenges for employing these 
models.  We recommend further research be conducted to answer these arguments. 
From our literature review and interviews, we derived three significant arguments 
against the Equity Investment Model.  First, the success of the Equity Investment Model 
cannot be properly measured.  Second, the Equity Investment Model creates ethical 
conflicts.  Lastly, the small amount of funding provided through the Equity Investment 
Model is too insignificant to provide benefit to the DoD. 
A. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EQUITY INVESTMENT MODEL  
The DoD faces significant challenges for measuring the results of Equity 
Investment Government VC initiatives.  Despite In-Q-Tel’s categorization as an Equity 
Investment VC initiative, the company’s leadership has a different philosophy.  In our 
interview with D. Tighe, the Vice President of In-Q-Tel, he pointed out that, while it is 
pleased to earn any financial returns to save taxpayer dollars, In-Q-Tel does not solely 
aim for financial gain.  In fact, Tighe (2007) defined In-Q-Tel’s job as “technology 
integration, discovery and development” and “to some degree…about integration.”  
Readers need to understand this philosophy because it challenges the measure of success.  
How do you measure the effectiveness of In-Q-Tel’s technology integration, discovery, 
development, or integration?  Clearly, the hard part of an Equity Investment VC initiative 
is determining metrics for success (Maney, 2004).   
This challenge applies to all Equity Investment Government VC initiatives, 
especially when the DoD does not yet have sufficient data on past performance.  OnPoint 
is also struggling with this fact right now.  OnPoint’s goal is to deliver innovative 
products to the warfighter.  Thus far, OnPoint’s only successful technology transfer is a 
longer-lasting battery pack.  With only one product transfer, has OnPoint been 
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successful?  The Army Audit Agency Report estimated a cost savings over $375 million 
for the entire DoD because of the battery power indicator.  This is a substantial savings 
and could certainly support the benefit of an Equity Investment VC initiative.  
Unfortunately, statistics are not so readily available that show cost savings for other 
Equity Investment activities.  The Equity Investment Government VC initiatives should 
remain focused on identifying measures of success.  These Government VC initiatives 
are promising, but the DoD needs to properly defend the execution of taxpayer dollars to 
support them. 
Additionally, the DoD must realize the potential ethical conflicts created by the 
Equity Investment Model.  In-Q-Tel’s primary benefits lie in the venture team’s 
relationships with prospective and promising companies, as well as the team’s ability to 
support those companies’ growth (Arlen, 2004).  Unfortunately, there might be those who 
want to take advantage of the insider information gained from that position.  In addition, 
the Equity Investment Government VC initiatives have to be aware of the perception 
given by this unique position.  Already, In-Q-Tel contended with the negative publicity 
surrounding policies on executive compensation and employee profit-sharing, which 
created public controversy (Kaufman, 2006).  The Equity Investment Model challenges 
the status quo for federal acquisition, so leaders and managers need to keep the initiatives 
above reproach in order to sustain the advantageous work performed in these 
organizations.   
Lastly, proponents of the Equity Investment Model must contend with an 
argument that attacks the core of its use—does the relatively small amount of government 
“seed” money make a significant difference?  We encountered this argument in an 
interview with J. Miller of ComVentures, who supports the DeVenCI effort.  J. Miller 
pointed out that, in the current private equity and venture market, there is a tremendous 
amount of capital available for start-ups.  Federal funding through the Equity Investment 
initiatives might not be as powerful as hoped because, “as a company starts to mature, 
there are many, many sources of capital that are looking to invest at early stages,” and 
there has “been a return to the market of hedge funds and private investors looking to 
invest in private companies again” (Miller, 2007).   
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Why might the large amount of capital pose a problem for the government?  First, 
the many alternatives for capital might make the process for qualification and the 
relatively small amount of money available (i.e., $500K - $1M) relatively unattractive.  
Second, venture investing is a zero-sum game—meaning that when a company lets the 
government organization invest, it is excluding someone else from owning a part of the 
company.  Miller (2007) argued that “for hot start-ups, there tends to be investors in the 
company scrambling to own as much of the company as they can.” In addition, a 
company might decide it is not in its best interest to give ownership to the government.  
We need to point out that this argument has not been fully researched.  The next chapter 
compares the dollar amount invested by Equity Investment Government VC initiatives to 
firms in the VC industry to determine if the Government VC initiatives are investing 
enough money.  However, the researchers did not investigate whether equity investments 
have played a major role in determining return on technology.  We strongly recommend 
additional research into this area to determine whether an equity investment is even 
needed to have any return on technology. 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GRANT MODEL 
Like the Equity Model, the Grant Model is opposed by its share of arguments 
which future research should address.  This section does not contain an all-inclusive list 
of SBIR, the NTA RTVG, and ACIN shortcomings, but rather the four most significant 
points plaguing them: 
1. “Customers” of the Grant Model deal with bureaucracy and the limits of finite 
resources, which cause delays.   
2. Asymmetrical motivation—the entrepreneur must be proactive in getting the 
funds.  
3. Grants do no increase social benefits. 
4. Certain Grant Models, such as SBIR, have created a microcosm of “vulture” 




We will now elaborate on each of these points and provide specifics.  
1. Bureaucracy and Finite Resources Cause Delays 
The stereotypical bureaucracy commonly associated with government or 
government-associated programs seems to be most rampant with the Grant Models.  For 
example, the SBIR program works on a competitive proposal basis.  The decision to grant 
funds to a particular company could very well only happen because laws mandate 
agencies to grant a certain percentage of their budgets toward SBIR.  Thus, an 
undeserving project may get funding merely so a government office can meet its quota.  
The employees administering SBIR programs probably do not award funds as judiciously 
as a traditional VC, because their decisions have no bearing on their financial 
compensation.  This lack of financial incentive seems to also cause delays in granting 
funds.  
ACIN’s incubation services promise the right companies free office space and 
business guidance.  We have strong reason to believe such an attractive offering has high 
demand among entrepreneurial companies—and they are competing for space in ACIN’s 
20,000 square foot Waterfront Technology Center in Camden, NJ.  This “no room at the 
inn” syndrome can cause delays in developing new technologies, simply because 
companies which would benefit from the incubator services will be shut out. 
Finally, the insertion of the NTA as a coordinating link between the traditional 
VC community and the government adds another layer of fund management, which likely 
causes delays.  The NTA must not only screen companies for promising technologies, but 
must scrutinize them for the government.  Possibly the most significant factor causing 
delays for the DoD is that the DoD’s interest might not necessarily be represented by the 
NTA’s executor, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.  
2. The Entrepreneur Must Be Proactive to Receive Funding 
The lure of “free money” has entrepreneurs competing and clamoring for finite 
resources: government-backed grants and incubator services.  We might consider SBIR 
and the NTA as the “sellers,” and the entrepreneurial firms as the “buyers”—but all 
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parties operate within a “sellers’ market.”  Thus, firms must be proactive to receive 
grants, whether through a competitive proposal with SBIR, or by vying for consideration 
as “best-of-breed” entrepreneur by the NTA.  They must be proactive because the 
administering offices for SBIR and the NTA do not have to seek out willing grantees 
since they all but line up at their doors.  This highlights another shortcoming of the Grant 
Models: entrepreneurial firms are looking for free money, and do not necessarily value 
the marginal benefit their technological innovation will provide the government.  Since 
Grant Model programs do not actively seek out candidates to receive their dollars, the 
outcomes are less controllable.  
3. The Supposed Apolitical Nature of the Grant Model (SBIR) 
SBIR was intended to be a political program, but politics still seem to have a 
negative effect on social benefits.  The political pressure to maintain the impression of a 
successfully run government program may run counter to the best interest of 
technological advancement SBIR projects bring to society.  Opponents of the Grant 
Model say it does not, in reality, increase social benefits, because political influences 
steer the dollars toward projects which will garner votes, but not necessarily grant 
necessary capabilities.  Politicians like “success stories” for their campaigns, especially 
ones which allow them to brag about a grant which catalyzed a local company’s success.  
However, these stories will carry less clout if a project is funded, but the firm never 
achieves commercialization.   Cohen and Noll (1991) state that politicians can claim 
credit for the firm’s ultimate success even if the marginal contribution of the public funds 
was very low (Lerner, 1999).  Therefore, politicians may exert pressure on SBIR subunits 
to award grants to firms most likely to succeed, despite their projects’ merit of social 
benefits.  Finally, there is a question of the subunits and their agendas.  Lerner (1999) 
says awards center on firms’ ability to meet agency (subunit) needs, not their innovation.  
Thus, it seems the SBIR program does not have the built-in incentives necessary for 




4. The Existence of SBIR “Mills” 
Finally, the SBIR program’s many benefits make it a very attractive alternative to 
equity-based VC models; yet, at the same time, these benefits can create unintended, 
negative consequences.   The most significant consequence is the creation of “parasitic” 
small businesses, which receive a disproportionate number of SBIR grants (Lerner, 
1999).   To understand why this is a negative consequence, one must understand the 
rationale for the SBIR program: the grants are designed to spur innovation for projects 
which would not otherwise obtain funding.  The grants are not meant to be “handouts” 
for well-connected small businesses which merely want to avoid giving away equity in 
their company.  
The promise of grant money captures wide attention in entrepreneurial circles, 
including that of “freeloading” companies, which have no intention of maturing their 
organization to the point of no longer needing grants.  This phenomenon is referred to as 
the “SBIR mill” (Lerner, 1999, p. 296).  Although the SBIR program’s funding authority 
has always had an expiration date, Congress has never let the program lapse since its 
inception in 1982.  Thus, the small businesses continually receiving awards (which are 
neither commercializing nor growing) have developed a certain dependency on grants—
clearly a growing concern.  Experts concluded it takes five to nine years for a company to 
progress from a concept to a commercial product (Lerner, 1992).   According to a 1992 
GAO report, these companies continually receiving grants would have made the leap to 
being large businesses, or at least would have commercialized more products without the 
promise of SBIR grants.  Indeed, many of these “freeloaders” have staffs in Washington 
that focus on identifying opportunities for applications; yet, they appear to commercialize 
projects at a significantly lower rate than other firms (Lerner, 1992).  Such dependency 
on the “SBIR mill” is one of the most profound arguments against the Grant Model.  
The next section will determine differences, as well as the advantages and 
disadvantages, of the various Government VC initiatives, compare and contrast the 
investment portfolios of the VC industry vs. the Government VC initiatives, and 
determine if the VC industry provides a relevant source for government R&D. 
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C. THE REAL PROBLEM IS TRANSFERRING THE TECHNOLOGY 
All the Government VC initiatives have succeeded in partnering with the 
commercial industry to increase the DoD’s social network.  The DoD has a tool in the 
Government VC initiatives to tap into the emerging innovative technology out in 
commercial industry.  However, is the DoD only looking for exposure?  If so, is that the 
sole measurement of success?  Again, we would like to emphasize that a meaningful 
metric for the success of the different Government VC initiatives is nebulous, at best.   
All the Government VC initiatives are successful in one way or another, but there are 
arguments against some Government VC initiatives.  Are the Government VC initiatives 
really successful at transferring technology into the DoD infrastructure?  We found 
information to support this argument from different sources.  The first sources discussed 
are audits conducted by BENS (2001) and an audit conducted by the Senate’s Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SCI) (2007). 
BENS (2001) stated that In-Q-Tel is successfully delivering innovation to the 
CIA, but faces challenges when transferring the technology into the CIA’s infrastructure.  
In-Q-Tel’s business model is a challenge to the CIA’s security framework, which 
requires time to insert the new technology.  Any technology inserted into the CIA must 
be reviewed by up to six formal boards (BENS, 2001).  The audit conducted by the SCI 
(2007) found similar challenges similar to BENS’ findings (2001).  SCI (2007) found that 
In-Q-Tel’s successes are mostly in the area of analytic tools, but the CIA’s old 
infrastructure and bureaucratic processes hinder the transference of the new technology.  
The NRAC (2006) and the Army Science Board (ASB) (2001) found the same challenge 
during their VC panel. 
The ASB (2001) was tasked to conduct a study on VC as a tool for the Army; it 
suggested the Army should not create a VC firm such as In-Q-Tel.  The overall finding 
by the VC panel was, “The critical issue is not the generation of funding for science and 
technology, but the Army’s ability to identify transformational, commercial technologies 
and policies and procedures to transition those technologies rapidly into Army system” 
(2001, slide 17).  The Army still decided to create OnPoint after the findings by the ASB 
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VC panel.  The NRAC (2006) VC report pointed out prior recommendations for 
acquisition reform and technology insertion that were never implemented.  The NRAC 
VC panel also cautioned against creating a VC firm such as In-Q-Tel for the Navy.  What 
specifically did these studies find that makes technology transition so difficult?   
The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies published a 
paper in 2004 titled, “Accelerating Technology Transition: Bridging the Valley of Death 
for Materials and Processes in Defense Systems.”  In this paper, the NRC (2004) 
discussed the importance of and the difficulties in transitioning technology.  Some of the 
main challenges discussed in this paper are the impediments stemming from the DoD’s 
“cultural traits.”  The NRC says the DoD’s culture tends to be very bureaucratic, and its 
acquisition processes usually favor large businesses over smaller, start-up companies. 
The NRC (2004) found that based on historical data, the DoD has been inefficient at 
inserting new technologies into defense systems.  
Most—if not all—of the Government VC initiatives have some sort of team 
responsible for transferring technology, but are they efficient and effective?  Based on the 
various sources from government and independent audits to agency VC panels, it seems 
that new technology is being introduced, but faces challenges with the transition.  This 
argument is probably the most important one, and will be further discussed in our 
conclusion.  However, before our conclusion we will analyze the information and data 
gathered from the VC industry, Government VC initiatives, and the QDR.  More 













VI.  ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapters, we have discussed data and information on the VC 
industry, current investment activities of the DoD Government VC initiatives, and the 
characteristics of the DoD Government VC initiatives in the context of the DoD VC 
spectrum.  We have also recommended QDR investment areas and presented arguments 
against the VC models.  With this information, we will: 1) analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of the models, 2) conduct a comparison and contrast of the VC industry 
and DoD VC investment portfolios, and 3) formulate a determination of the VC industry 
as a relevant source for DoD R&D.   
A. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE DOD VC MODELS 
We characterized the Government VC initiatives along a spectrum in order to 
better understand their distinguishing characteristics.  An understanding of the 
characteristics of the Equity Investment, Grant, and Communication Catalyst Models will 
help leadership make decisions about future Government VC initiatives.  To further 
facilitate decision-making, this sub-section provides a discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages for each model.  Figure 22 provides a summary of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the VC models.  This matrix will help decision-makers quickly identify 
models that present the best opportunities. 
 
Figure 23.   Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages of  
Government VC Models 
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1. Equity Investment Model 
The Equity Investment Model provides six distinct advantages: increases the 
government’s VC social network, helps the acquisition community overcome 
bureaucracy, provides a certification effect to other investors, enables the acquisition 
community to leverage additional funding, provides the DoD with increased insight into 
firms and products, and minimizes overall R&D costs.   
The primary motivation for the VC movement in government centers around the 
concern that we do not have access to the information about products and services that 
can improve our warfighting capability.  The Equity Investment Model enables the DoD 
to directly participate in the VC community, thereby enhancing the DoD’s social 
network.  A social network is a structure that consists of nodes (usually people or 
organizations) that are linked together by common values or ideas.  For instance, In-Q-
Tel’s ability to network with its matrix of venture teams to provide marketing insights 
and strategic guidance benefits the DoD, the VCs, and the start-up companies (Lerner et 
al., 2004).  In fact, this network proved invaluable for In-Q-Tel because “the most 
common source of introductions that led to In-Q-Tel investments […] was through 
network members, either through a company’s network, In-Q-Tel’s network, or a 
combination of the two” (Belko, 2001, p. 69). 
The unique relationship derived from equity investment also helps the acquisition 
community overcome bureaucracy.  The literature indicates that the amount of paperwork 
and legal obstacles hinder small, innovative companies from doing business with 
government.  The funding process of the government is incredibly bureaucratic, and 
companies who have never done business with the government quickly learn that 
Congressional appropriations equate to a relatively significant cost in time—time that is 
precious for a start-up company (Lerner et al., 2004).  While stakeholders understand the 
need for this bureaucracy, leadership must understand the trade-off.  The entrepreneurs 
should spend time developing innovative technologies to increase the DoD’s warfighting 
capability—not filling out paperwork.  When given the choice, many small companies  
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will choose to do their business elsewhere.  For this reason, the Equity Investment Model 
enables the government to do business with the start-up companies in a more 
collaborative fashion (Arlen, 2004).    
This trade-off, while minimizing oversight, actually increases the DoD’s insight 
into the start-up companies.  The Equity Investment Model enables the government to 
gain seats on the management boards, resulting into an insider’s view of the company and 
its product.  This insight allows the government to identify problems in product 
development (Arlen, 2004).  In traditional acquisition structures, the company is not 
necessarily required to tell the government all its problems.  However, under the Equity 
Investment Model, the VC initiative can identify problems earlier.   
Because the DoD can leverage additional funding with VC, the government 
achieves this position of influence at the same time as it enjoys a potentially lower R&D 
cost.  The VC funding process brings the government together with private VC firms and 
innovative companies to establish a partnership that invests more funding than the DoD 
provides.  As discussed by Lerner et al. (2004), the Equity Investment Model enabled the 
CIA to sample the technology before it bought it, all while leveraging other funding.  In-
Q-Tel recognized that $40 million was a relatively insignificant amount of money for a 
direct procurement (Lerner et al., 2004).  Equity investments allow the government to 
share the cost for R&D.   OnPoint’s success is evidence of this fact—“for every dollar 
invested by OnPoint, private venture capital investors have co-invested more than six 
dollars” (Rottenberg, 2006, p. 46).  
Admittedly, the leverage argument has to be the primary advantage of this model 
because the government has to leverage its funds—it cannot provide comparable funding 
to compete with VC investors.  Obviously, this is not the goal of a Government VC 
initiative.  However, the Acknowledgements section contained the argument that Equity 
Investment suffers from this small amount of money because there are decreasing 
opportunities in the market (J. Miller, 2007).  However, in an interview with Gilman 
Louie, former CEO of In-Q-Tel, In-Q-Tel’s association with the CIA (and the associated 
“test bed” environment) far outweighed In-Q-Tel’s small amount of money (Louie, 
2007).  In fact, Mr. Louie stated that In-Q-Tel’s structure as a strategic venture fund 
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required that In-Q-Tel market its technical due diligence and position as a “seal of 
approval.” (Louie, 2007).  The equity investment enables the government to gain 
improved insight, but, by providing unique, value-added input to small companies, the 
government’s knowledge and input far outweighed the relatively small amount of equity. 
Mr. Louie mentioned In-Q-Tel’s position as a “seal of approval.” (Louie, 2007).  
In addition to leveraging funds, the Equity Investment Model results in a phenomenon 
known as the Certification Effect.  Both Lerner and Wallsten discuss this phenomenon 
and how it relates to public venture programs; however, evidence indicates that there is a 
Certification Effect with the Equity Investment Model as well.  The Certification Effect 
describes the unofficial signaling sent to other companies and investors about the 
potential for technical excellence by a small company when the government shows 
interest in the company’s product.  For In-Q-Tel, the government “certifies” companies 
simply by showing interest, as well as by providing an early testing environment with 
their technology laboratory (Lerner et al., 2004).  In a study conducted by Belko (2001) at 
the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Certification Effect (or technological 
validation) ranked as the second most important reason companies were attracted to In-Q-
Tel.  In fact, 9 of the 13 companies believed their company’s relationship with In-Q-Tel 
provided a level of credibility with other companies and investors (Belko, 2001). 
Despite the advantages of the Equity Investment Model, leadership must be aware 
of several disadvantages.  We discussed in the Acknowledgements chapter that this 
model potentially creates an environment for ethical dilemmas.  Leadership must spend 
time considering and developing policies and procedures for an Equity Investment 
initiative that will not give an appearance of impropriety. 
Leadership must also give due consideration to the cultural resistance to Equity 
Investment activities.  Change management must be a priority because the DoD can be a 
risk-averse culture, and its members many times feel a need for a high level of control.  
Arlen (2004) points out that we must commit to an Equity Investment initiative and have 
a willingness to work with people who are very different than those with whom we 
normally work in the government.  Not only must we be comfortable working with 
different people, but we also need to get comfortable with a different process.  VC is very 
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different than the traditional acquisition structure, so DoD employees should not expect 
the working relationship to be similar to that created when managing defense contractors.  
The VC approach is collaborative and requires flexibility.   
The need for culture change requires personnel with a new set of skill sets to lead 
Government VC initiatives.  The human resource aspect of an Equity Investment 
initiative can be intense because the DoD must recruit, staff, and pay personnel with 
different skills sets.  The type of personnel we are looking for are very competitive in the 
commercial market.  The Acknowledgements chapter discussed the potential ethical 
dilemmas created by compensation packages at In-Q-Tel.  Despite this challenge, Mr. 
Louie stressed the need (and overall success) of the compensation agreements because 
the arrangement incentivized technology transition.  On the surface, the ability of 
employee’s to earn 10-40% based on company performance might be ethically 
questionable.  However, Mr. Louie established metrics that asked how many technologies 
were actually adopted by the CIA and how many technologies were actually piloted?  
These metrics were used to then reward the employees.  Therefore, the employees were 
not simply profiting from investments with taxpayer dollars because the overall goal was 
to deliver useful products to the warfighter. Unfortunately, In-Q-Tel no longer has an 
equity sharing program for its employees.  (Louie, 2007) 
In-Q-Tel achieved success with incentivizing technology transition.  As Mr. Louie 
stated, only 10% of the companies In-Q-Tel invested in ended up failing, which is a 
phenomenal rate for VC investing (Louie, 2007).  Despite In-Q-Tel’s success, technology 
transition still presents a significant challenge to the Equity Investment Model as well.  In 
many of the interviews for this project, respondents mentioned the difficulty of 
transitioning the technology to the warfighter.  The DoD possesses many tools to 
facilitate this process, such as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).  
However, the DoD has not officially established a process or procedure for linking the 
Government VC initiatives with any of these Technology Transition organizations.  
Leadership must consider this phase of the VC acquisition process.   
Lastly, as discussed in the Acknowledgements section, a significant challenge to 
the Equity Investment Model is determining how to measure success, In-Q-Tel still 
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struggles with this issue.  It had to update its metrics to focus on technology insertion 
instead of number of proposals received (Molzahn, 2003).  OnPoint also recognized the 
challenge of technology transition to the Equity Investment Model. OnPoint’s focus is on 
“a company that has a strong chance of transitioning technology” (Cox & McGee, 2005, 
p. 64), so it can measure how many products are transitioned to the warfighter.  In this 
period of decreasing budgets, leadership must adequately communicate how to define 
success so managers will be able to strive for, measure and communicate success. 
2. Grant Model 
The Grant Model provides numerous advantages as well.  As with the Equity 
Investment Model, the DoD can expand its social network with the Grant Model.  While 
the SBIR program can be bureaucratic, ACIN and the NTA have developed procedures 
for overcoming the bureaucracy.  The Army allowed industry partners to retain data 
rights for commercial purposes, but also structured a payback method for royalties to be 
returned to ACIN for maintenance and operations (Deitch, 2004). 
While social networking and overcoming bureaucracy are benefits of the Grant 
Model, the model’s true power lies in three specific areas: the Certification Effect, filling 
a funding gap in the VC industry, and enhancing the technology base.  As discussed 
earlier, the Certification Effect signals other investors that a company possesses technical 
potential.  Lerner argues that this is a primary benefit of public VC programs because 
“public subsidies for small high-technology firms […] convey information to other 
potential investors” (Lerner, 1999, p. 291).  The government cannot underestimate the 
importance of the Certification Effect.   
By providing valuable information to potential investors, Government VC 
initiatives are able to fill a gap between small companies and investors. This gap exists 
because private capital markets are unable to collect sufficient information on the projects 
of small companies (Lerner, 1999; Cooper, 2003).  The gap exists not only because of the 
inability to gather such information but also because VC firms choose not to spend time 
and money on investigating smaller ventures (Cooper, 2003). Thus, the government 
performs a critical function with Grant Model initiatives.    One such gap exists between 
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seed and start-up stages in VC funding, which can be seen in Figure 23 below.  If the 
DoD contemplates the use of a Grant Model initiative, leadership should take this 
information and funding gap into account.   
 
Figure 24.   Funding Gap [From Cooper, 2003] 
The final advantage of the Grant Model lay in the DoD’s ability to enhance its 
technology base.  Congress established the SBIR program in order to enhance U.S. 
competitiveness.  Evidence indicates that companies supported by the SBIR program 
grew at a faster rate than similar firms.  In fact, in survey responses, companies indicated 
that 50% of the firms surveyed would not have started or continued if the SBIR program 
had not been available (Cooper, 2003).  Clearly, the Grant Model represents an 
opportunity for the DoD to commercialize technology while enhancing the technology 
base.   
Unfortunately, the Grant Model’s success is hindered by critical disadvantages.  
First, DoD leaders and managers are significantly challenged by the need for change 
management.  The government culture can be risk-averse and controlling.  The SBIR 
program provides the best solution for these challenges.  Within the government’s risk-
averse culture, evidence indicates that managers are unwilling to fund marginal efforts 
because regulatory guidelines do not encourage them to fund such projects.  What is the 
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result?  There is a “remarkably high success rate of funded projects [that…] did not take 
sufficient risks” (Wallsten, 2000, p. 86).  Adding further frustration is the fact that 
evidence indicates that actual investment is relatively low—a paltry 3% of SBIR projects 
have received VC investment—despite the high success rate of funded projects and the 
potential for VC investment during Phase III (Cooper, 2003).   
Lastly, the unintended consequences of Grant Model initiatives provide reasons 
for concern.  With the SBIR program, evidence indicates a crowding-out effect of 
industry R&D and a manipulation of the proposal system.  Wallsten’s study argued that 
the government should see an overall increase in industry’s R&D activities when a 
company earns grant funding because the company should initiate R&D activities that 
were not previously considered profitable.  Unfortunately, evidence suggests otherwise.  
Wallsten found that the amount of grant funding does not affect employment, which 
seems to indicate that companies are simply supplementing their own R&D funds with 
government subsidies (Wallsten, 2000). 
The same study by Wallsten indicates that certain entities have developed a 
specialty for winning SBIR contracts and may be manipulating the system.  These 
companies have come to be known as “SBIR mills.”  This phenomenon may be further 
complicated because government managers factor past performance into award decisions 
and do not necessarily take into account the potential for technological innovation from 
unproven offerors (Lerner, 2003).    
3. Communication Catalyst Model 
The Communication Catalyst Model provides an interesting opportunity for the 
DoD.  This model attempts to capture many of the benefits of the other models without 
the capital investment.  The Communication Catalyst Model’s primary advantage is its 
seemingly minimal cost compared to the other models.  The government does not 
participate in equity investment and can dedicate a smaller number of personnel to the 
initiative. For instance, the Communication Catalyst Model significantly increases the 
DoD’s social network.  DeVenCI’s team of eleven venture capitalists is unpaid, yet they 
provide access to knowledge and contacts that would be virtually inaccessible for the 
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government (DeVenCI, 2007).  We will have a difficult time placing a value on the social 
networking benefits of these models.  And though the DoD gives up the opportunity to 
directly influence the companies, with the Communication Catalyst Model, it is gaining 
access to the network for a lesser cost.   
Despite the smaller investment, the Communication Catalyst Model still enables 
the DoD to minimize the timeline for identifying emerging technologies.  The 
establishment of DeVenCI focused on the need to increase DoD awareness of emerging 
commercial technologies developed by non-traditional DoD procurement sources to help 
fight the Global War on Terrorism (Pohanka, 2007).  DeVenCI's primary objective is to 
identify commercially developed products that are mature enough for warfighter use with 
minimal modification. 
The quick identification of technology will hopefully enable delivery of a 
capability to the warfighter in 6-18 months (Pohanka, 2007).  Admittedly, the 
responsibility for technology transition lies with the traditional acquisition organizations. 
There are still significant challenges for this model in that arena.  However, the overall 
minimal cost compared to the other models with many of the same advantages makes the 
Communication Catalyst Model an attractive option for leaders considering a VC 
initiative. 
Leaders should not discount the challenge of transitioning technologies brought to 
the DoD by DeVenCI. Mr. Jeb Miller, one of the DeVenCI VC consultants, recognizes 
this challenge.  He is adamant that the DeVenCI team will significantly decrease the 
timeline for technology identification.  However, he questions "how we can best shorten 
the timeframe to actually procure technology, that's a piece we don't yet have the good 
case studies for" (Miller, 2007).  Mr. Gilman Louie supports this assertion.  He stated that 
finding technologies and providing funding are the easiest parts of VC to accomplish-
technology transition and adoption is the most difficult aspect o Government VC (Louie, 
2007). 
For most of the VC models, we lack past performance data, which makes it 
difficult to measure and determine success.  This is especially true for the 
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Communication Catalyst Model.  Observers will have to be patient to see how initiatives 
such as DeVenCI and the CTTO successfully build relationships and bring together VCs, 
innovative companies, and the warfighter.  Ultimately, the researchers of this article 
firmly believer that technology transition and adoption are the critical goal; therefore, 
metrics must center on this goal to determine success. 
B. VC INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT VC INITIATIVE PORTFOLIOS 
In Chapters II and III, we assessed the VC industry and Government VC 
initiatives separately.  We discussed the VC industry and Government VC initiatives’ 
resources, investments, portfolio companies, exits, and performance.  This section 
integrates information about the VC industry and Government VC initiatives based on 
previous independent assessments.  More specifically, we answer the following questions 
by comparing and contrasting the VC industry to Government VC initiatives: 
1. Are the government’s equity investments and total capital under management 
significant compared to the VC industry? 
 
2. What investment stage is the government equity investments mainly concentrated 
and is this effective with the current VC industry conditions? 
 
3. What is the average age of investments made by Government VC initiatives 
compared to those made by the VC industry? 
 
4. How do exits made by Government VC initiatives compare to exits from the VC 
industry? 
 
5. Is there a trend in the geographic concentration of investments made by 
Government VC initiatives and the VC industry? 
The answers to these questions can provide the basis for implementing a government VC 
initiative.  By understanding the VC industry, the government can make the best 





1. Are the Government’s Equity Investments and Capital under 
Management Significant Compared to the VC Industry? 
This question only pertains to Government VC initiatives with equity 
investments.  We addressed this question earlier in our Acknowledgement chapter as an 
argument against the Equity Model.  However, based on a comparison of the resource 
and investment data for government equity models and the VC industry, we believe the 
equity investments made by Government VC initiatives and capital under management 
are significant compared to private firms in the VC industry.  
According to the NVCA Yearbook (2007a), 43% of all VC firms managed up to 
$50 million, while 21% managed at least $250 million in 2006.  On average, OnPoint 
managed up to $12.36 million per year since its inception in 2003, while In-Q-Tel 
managed up to $40 million per year since its 1999 inception.  In-Q-Tel’s capital under 
management is similar to about half of all the private firms in the VC industry with 
investments up to $50 million.  OnPoint is similar to the bottom 15% of all private VC 
firms; however, OnPoint is in the upper economic portion of the 15%, with $12.36 
million under management.  G. Burnette, who was one of the general partners at Red 
Planet Capital, said it is reasonable to have a $30 or $50 million fund outside Silicon 
Valley.  Burnette (2007) said smaller funds are reasonable “in part because there is not as 
much company generation going on outside of Silicon Valley so you can invest smaller 
amounts at a slower pace” (2007).  We believe that OnPoint and In-Q-Tel’s capital under 
management is significant for equity investments, since almost half of the private VC 
firms only manage up to $50 million.   
Private VC firms (on average) invested $5.26 million for initial-round financing 
and $10.25 million in follow-on financing.  In-Q-Tel makes $500,000 to $3 million 
investments, while OnPoint’s investments are $500,000 to $2.5 million.  On average, 
each private VC firm invested in four companies in 2006, while In-Q-Tel averaged 
almost 13 per year and OnPoint four to six per year.  Unlike private VC firms, In-Q-Tel 
and OnPoint make strategic investments instead of financial investments, so they do not 
need to match the investments made by private VC firms.   
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In-Q-Tel is more than capable of matching the private VC firms based off its 
capital under management. Likewise, OnPoint’s capital under management allows it to 
match the private VC firms’ initial-round financing.  However, due to the strategic 
investments, In-Q-Tel and OnPoint are not looking for a return on investment, so they do 
not need to make big investments.  According to Louie (2007), In-Q-Tel’s objective was 
focused on sub-optimizing across its portfolio by investing the least amount of money 
possible to gain access to the most amount of technology in its earliest stage.  This is 
probably why In-Q-Tel and OnPoint make more investments on average per year than 
private VC firms.    
2. What Investment Stage(s) are the Government Equity Investments 
Mainly Concentrated and are these Effective with the Current VC 
Industry Conditions? 
Government equity investments are primarily concentrated in early-round 
financing.  Despite the small amount of capital managed, government equity investments 
are significant.  They are not meant to compete with private VC firms that manage 
greater than $250 million.  The amount of capital a Government VC manages seems to 
determine when it invests. This finding is supported by interviews with VC fund 
managers, articles, and other research.   
Government equity investments are mostly made in Series A and B rounds, or the 
initial-round financing.  Tighe (2007) said that even though In-Q-Tel does not 
concentrate in one area, it has a history of primarily investing in Series A and B rounds.  
Burnette (2007) said, “it is very rare that a company can use $10 million as its Series A 
round.”  Burnette (2007) stated that Red Planet Capital planned to initially invest small 
amounts in early-stage companies and increase the funding every year as the companies 
hit their milestones.  He also pointed out that investing small amounts does not work for 
big funds such as Sequoia because “they just have too much money that has to be parked 
somewhere” (2007).  This leads into how small and big VC firms interact and how this 
interaction supports small government equity investments.   
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According to Nooteboom (2002), small VC firms have relatively lower 
transaction costs because they handle early-stage investments more efficiently than larger 
firms.  A firm managing $500 million cannot make many $2 million deals because the 
transaction costs alone exceed the benefits.  Due to these transaction costs, larger VC 
firms depend on smaller ones to deliver information on new, promising companies 
(Hibbard, 2004).  Hibbard (2004) believes small VC firms have the edge now because the 
early-stage companies are worth less than they were in the late 1990’s.  This makes early-
stage investments smaller and larger VC firms’ investments harder (Hibbard, 2004).   
Manigart et al. (2002), in a five-country study, found that VC firms had lower 
required return on investment for all stages, with a greater percentage of smaller 
investments.  Investments in startup and seed-stage companies increased 44.2% from 
2005.  This high percentage is explained by the industry concluding existing projects and 
focusing instead on the new, upcoming deals (NVCA, 2007).  According to Nooteboom 
(2002) Hibbard (2004), and Manigart et al (2002), the government can make small equity 
investments in Series A and B early-stage rounds and take advantage of the current VC 
industry trend.   
3. What is the Average Age of Investments Made by Government VC 
Initiatives Compared to those Made by the VC Industry? 
In-Q-Tel is the only government VC initiative with historical data to make this 
comparison to the VC industry.  OnPoint is still young compared to In-Q-Tel, with an 
average age of 3.5 years (at most) for its investments.  All other Government VC 
initiatives do not pertain to this question, because they do not make equity investments.  
In-Q-Tel has 60 companies in its portfolio, with investments in 50 of the companies.  The 
average time since In-Q-Tel’s first investment in each of those 50 companies is 36 
months (In-Q-Tel, 2007).  How does the average age of In-Q-Tel’s investments compare 
with the VC industry? 
The median age of all venture-backed IPOs increased to 96 months in 2006 from 
72 months the previous year (NVCA, 2007).  In-Q-Tel’s investments are still fairly 
young compared to the venture-backed IPOs.  If In-Q-Tel is concerned about IPOs, then 
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its investments still have around 60 months before the possibility of going public.  
However, In-Q-Tel is not worried about IPOs because it focuses on return on technology 
in contrast to financial returns from IPOs.  Even though an IPO is not a measurement of 
success for In-Q-Tel, it still has the potential to make a return on investment from IPOs.     
In-Q-Tel’s investment in Ionatron is an example in which In-Q-Tel profited from 
an IPO in one of its investments.  According to the NVCA Yearbook (2007a), only 1 in 6 
companies ever goes public.  In-Q-Tel’s 50 investments could result in about 8 IPOs 
within the next 60 months.  Even though In-Q-Tel is not concerned about return on 
investment, the possibility of a new R&D funding mechanism from In-Q-Tel’s return on 
investment cannot be ignored.  
4. How do Exits Made by Government VC Initiatives Compare to Exits 
from the VC Industry? 
In-Q-Tel is the only government VC initiative with data to answer this question.  
Since inception, In-Q-Tel had two IPOs with Ionatron and Electro Energy; however, six 
of In-Q-Tel’s companies were acquired by companies such as Google and IBM (In-Q-
Tel, 2007).  This seems to correlate with the trend in the VC industry.  According to the 
NVCA Yearbook (2007a), the most feasible route to exit for venture-backed companies is 
through a merger and acquisition (M&A).  Venture-backed M&A activity accounted for 
85% of the total exits in 2006.  The VC industry only had 57 venture-backed IPOs in 
2006 out of 798 private VC firms.  In-Q-Tel’s exits seem to follow the VC industry trend, 
with acquisitions accounting for the majority of their exits.     
5. Is There a Trend in the Geographic Concentration of Investments 
Made by Government VC Initiatives and the VC Industry? 
The researchers believe there is a trend in the concentration of investments.  The 
figure below shows the top five states that received funding from the VC industry—In-Q-
Tel, OnPoint, and SBIR.  We retrieved this data from the NVCA Yearbook (2007a) and 




Industry In-Q-Tel OnPoint SBIR 
1 CA CA CA CA 
2 MA VA MA MA 
3 TX MA MO VA 
4 NY CO VA OH 
5 WA OR & MN UK CO 
Figure 25.   Top 5 States with the Most Funding 
The VC industry and the Government VC initiatives all invested in California and 
Massachusetts.  The Government VC initiatives all had Virginia in their top five.  The 
Government VC initiatives seem to leverage their invested dollars with the VC industry 
well.  SBIR does not make equity investments, but SBIR companies require additional 
funding during Phase III from private sources such as the VC industry.  This means some 
companies that receive SBIR grants also receive funding from the VC industry.  The 
Government VC initiatives can leverage their investment dollars with the VC industry by 
concentrating in few states; however, this can disguise the government VC initiative’s 
true performance.  We raised this concern in our argument against the Grant Model: the 
government has a tendency to only invest in what is popular and already successful.   
The Government VC initiatives under the Equity Model seem to follow VC 
industry trends.  Government equity investments and capital under management are 
significant enough for the VC industry.  The smaller government equity investments can 
impact the rise in early-stage companies.  Even though return on investment is not a goal 
for government equity investments, this could possibly provide an innovative R&D 
funding mechanism.  However, this will be hard to implement in a risk-averse culture 
such as the DoD.  The VC industry is a great source to tap into for the DoD.  The next 
section analyzes how the VC industry can be a relevant source for government R&D.  
C. VC AS A RELEVANT SOURCE FOR GOVERNMENT R&D 
As the commercial world advances technology at an ever-increasing pace, can the 
government rely on the VC industry to “conduct” a major portion of its R&D and 
implementation, with dual-use technologies as deliverables?  The short answer to this 
question is “yes,” when the following analyses are conducted: 1) using the QDR focus 
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areas of investment, determine the amounts invested in each of those areas; 2) in 
considering the amounts invested in the QDR focus areas, determine whether a 
government-sponsored VC initiative would benefit from investing in those areas; and 3) 
determine VC funding options available in the QDR-defined areas.  
1. Levels of Investment in QDR-focused Areas    
The government’s acquisition requirements reside in five main areas: information 
technology, medical & biotechnology, intelligence/surveillance, language/cultural 
learning, and logistics.  Unfortunately, the different categories (areas of investment) in 
the QDR are not analogous to the main categories of VC investment as defined by the 
NVCA.  The NVCA uses nine mutually exclusive categories to separate all VC into 
“industries.”  The misalignment of these categories can be seen in Figure 25 below. 
 
QDR areas of investment:  NVCA investment categories: 
Information Technology Telecommunications 
Medical & Biotechnology  Computer Hardware and Services 
Intelligence & Surveillance Computer Software 
Language & Cultural  Business/Financial 
Logistics Semiconductors and Electronics 
 Biotechnology 
 Healthcare related 
 Retailing and Media 
 Industrial/Energy 
Figure 26.   Five QDR Areas of Investment vs.  
Nine NVCA Investment Categories 
In order to properly determine if the VC industry can support government R&D, 
our research must align these categories.  Why is it so important to “force-fit” each of 
these QDR investment areas into the NVCA categories?  The actual data presented in the 
NVCA Yearbook is presented at the level of these nine investment categories; further 
granularity is not readily available and is beyond the scope of our project.     
Using the Venture Economics Industry Codes (VEIC), the five areas of the QDR 
were matched to corresponding NVCA investment categories.  These codes are VC’s 
counterparts to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).  A four-digit number gives the greatest level of 
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detail in identifying an industry.  For example, the code 4525 is “biotech laser and 
optotronic applications.”  Matching “information technology” and “medical & 
biotechnology” to the NVCA investment categories was straightforward and obvious.  
This is the match-up: 
QDR area of investment NVCA investment category 
information technology Telecommunications 
information technology computer hardware and services 
information technology computer software 
medical & biotechnology biotechnology 
medical & biotechnology healthcare related 
Figure 27.   IT & Medical and Matched NVCA Areas 
The more stubborn challenge came with matching “intelligence & surveillance,” 
“language & cultural,” and “logistics” to the broad VC investment categories.  Which 
VEICs correspond to intelligence & surveillance, language & cultural, and logistics?  
This was largely a manual, qualitative decision made using the VEIC list found in the 
2007 NVCA Yearbook.  Thus, we looked through each VEIC in the list for codes relevant 
for the three unclassified QDR areas of investment.  This is the outcome:   
QDR area of investment VEIC # VEIC description 
NVCA investment 
category 
language & cultural 2733 educational Software computer software 
language & cultural 2752 natural language computer software 
language & cultural 7130 toys/electronic games retailing and media 
language & cultural 7550 
education and educational products and 
materials retailing and media 
logistics 1560 e-commerce technology 
computer hardware and 
services 
logistics 2739 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
software computer software 
logistics 2873 data warehousing services 
computer hardware and 
services 
logistics 8230 process control equipment and systems industrial/energy 
logistics 9300 business services business/financial 
logistics 9340 distributors, importers, and wholesalers business/financial 
intelligence & surveillance 2910 voice synthesis computer software 
intelligence & surveillance 2911 voice recognition computer software 
intelligence & surveillance 3120 microprocessors, controllers, and sensors 
semiconductors and 
electronics 
intelligence & surveillance 3810 




intelligence & surveillance 3835 Security/Alarm Sensors/Detectors 
semiconductors and 
electronics 
intelligence & surveillance 3900 Optoelectronics 
semiconductors and 
electronics 
Figure 28.   VEICs for Language & Cultural, Logistics, and Intelligence & Surveillance 
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As the chart above indicates, the three unclassified areas of QDR investment do 
not fit neatly into the NVCA investment categories.  For example, “logistics” fits into 
four of the NVCA categories: computer hardware and services, business/financial, 
industrial/energy, and computer software.  In addition, we see many crossovers within 
each QDR investment area.   
The common anchor among all five QDR investment areas is computers, more 
specifically software.   Not surprisingly, the investment category with the greatest amount 
of investment in 2006 was computer software.  Computer software has consistently been 
the top-funded sector for the last five years, and has been in the top three for the last 10 
years.  However, biotechnology has also emerged as a prominent VC category, 
particularly since the stock market’s recovery from the dot-com bear market beginning in 
2002.  Its move from the bottom half of the sectors to the top, after 2002, indicate its 
growing importance.  
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Computer Software 3,417 4,529 10,511 24,377 10,342 5,231 4,469 5,253 4,809 5,023 77,961 
Biotechnology 1,438 1,595 2,098 4,311 3,412 3,161 3,693 4,273 3,863 4,656 32,500 
Telecommunications 2,578 4,368 12,649 28,438 11,213 5,107 3,559 3,534 3,964 3,675 79,085 
Healthcare-related 1,887 2,113 3,021 3,898 2,529 2,224 1,823 2,092 2,604 3,067 25,258 
Semiconductors and 
Electronics 884 872 1,637 4,372 2,760 1,842 2,026 2,576 2,268 2,732 21,969 
Retailing and Media 2,036 3,135 12,303 17,286 3,533 1,140 1,124 1,463 1,675 2,375 46,070 
Industrial/Energy 783 1,486 1,873 2,725 1,280 744 828 761 912 1,866 13,258 
Computer Hardware 
and Services 1,051 1,457 5,041 10,330 3,047 1,510 1,121 1,206 1,413 1,443 27,619 
Business/Financial 819 1,534 5,073 9,246 2,580 870 1,041 980 1,270 1,085 24,498 
Total 14,893 21,089 54,206 104,983 40,696 21,829 19,684 22,138 22,778 25,922 348,218 
Figure 29.   Dollars Invested by Industry Sector, in Millions  
[From NVCA, 2007] 
 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Average 10 
-year rank 
Computer Software 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1.4 
Biotechnology 5 5 7 7 4 3 2 2 3 2 4 
Telecommunications 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 2 
Healthcare-related 4 4 6 8 8 4 5 5 4 4 5.2 
Semiconductors and Electronics 7 9 9 6 6 5 4 4 5 5 6 
Retailing and Media 3 3 2 3 3 7 6 6 6 6 4.5 
Industrial/Energy 9 7 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 8.5 
Computer Hardware and Services 6 8 5 4 5 6 7 7 7 8 6.3 
Business/Financial 8 6 4 5 7 8 8 8 8 9 7.1 
Figure 30.   Relative Ranking of Sectors by Dollars Invested  
[From NVCA, 2007] 
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2. Feasibility of Government VC Initiatives to Pursue QDR Investment 
Areas 
The government would benefit using VC to fill its capability gaps within all QDR 
investment areas.  However, this does not necessarily mean it should invest actual 
taxpayer dollars in each investment area.  VC is a relevant source for government R&D 
for the following reasons:  
- The ever-increasing employment of dual-use technologies within the DoD can 
take advantage of entrepreneurial breakthroughs resulting from successful 
ventures.  These breakthroughs typically result in COTS items, which require 
little, if any, modification to make them suitable for DoD use.  We see no 
reason the government should not be a stakeholder in new technologies with 
its VC initiatives to steer dual-use technology developments. 
 
- Traditional government acquisition practices typically trail the private sector 
by 10 years or more (R. Rendon, personal communication, September 12, 
2007).  The government is doing itself a great disservice isolating its R&D 
efforts.  The processes tend to be slower, do not leverage funds, and do not 
interface with the commercial market to the same degree as VCs.   
 
- The QDR investment areas are each highly reliant on Internet-based 
technologies.  As the charts in the previous section demonstrated, the trend in 
VC is an increase in software development, which, in turn, depends largely on 
Internet technologies. (NVCA, 2007)   
 
The government’s nascent use of VC may make some stakeholders nervous because VC 
challenges traditional R&D practices. Yet, this falls in the same category as other 
successful government programs which are now privately managed—such as privatized 
military housing A-76 initiatives, aircraft maintenance performed by contractors for 
flying training units, and the Non-appropriated Fund Instrumentality (NAFI).  There are 
precedents for using commercial best practices to improve government processes, and 
VC is simply a potential way to improve the government’s R&D.   
3. Funding Possibilities and Mechanisms to Support VC in QDR 
Investment Areas 
The government’s portfolio of VC initiatives has grown significantly since the 
inception of In-Q-Tel in 1999.  This last section of our analysis proposes ways for the 
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DoD to use its existing VC initiatives and potentially expand them to support the QDR 
investment areas.  Specifically, the following questions are answered for each QDR 
investment area: 1) are the existing Government VC initiatives postured to fill capability 
gaps in the QDR areas of investments, and, if not, 2) which model(s) are best suited for 
each investment area? 
4. Information Technology 
The information technology area of investment holds the most promise for 
Government VC initiatives’ success.  To many entrepreneurs, especially in Silicon 
Valley, VC and information technology funding are synonymous.  Information 
technology projects—as opposed to other ventures which have a tangible end-product—
have a certain “translucence” that VCs seem to able to see which traditional lending 
institutions cannot.   The government should have few problems pooling its money with 
other investors for new VC opportunities.  In-Q-Tel, DeVenCI, SBIR, NTA, and ACIN 
are currently postured to support information technology.  
5. Intelligence and Surveillance  
One of the primary reasons for creating In-Q-Tel was to rapidly and economically 
update the CIA’s anachronistic technology so it would be commensurate with the 
capability levels in other parts of the government.  Arguably the most successful 
Government VC initiative to date, it has been the impetus for dual-use technologies (such 
as Google Earth, an iteration of Keyhole, Inc.’s revolutionary mapping system) which not 
only have spilled over into the DoD, but into the homes of personal computer users.  
Considering the size of the government and pejorative references to its bureaucratic 
nature, we argue the intercommunication between the CIA and DoD intelligence agencies 
is less than ideal.  Therefore, we recommend the government consider devising a way to 
funnel DoD intelligence interests to In-Q-Tel to factor in its investments.  This 
consolidation may spur further idea-sharing and innovation.  In-Q-Tel, DeVenCI, SBIR, 
NTA, and ACIN are currently postured to support intelligence and surveillance.   
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6. Medical and Biotechnology 
There are many benefits of a separate VC entity dedicated to closing medical and 
biotechnology capability gaps, especially with the increase of dollars invested by VCs in 
this area since 2002.  To be sure, the commercial world is essential if the DoD is to make 
progress in this area.  One of the authors has witnessed several efforts to band with 
industry at Brooks City-Base, TX.  At this installation, the Air Force Institute of 
Operational Health works side-by-side with biotech companies through CRADAs.  The 
researchers not investigate whether CRADAs seem to produce more favorable results 
than Government VC initiatives for medical and biotechnology concerns, but this would 
be an excellent area for additional research.   
Based on publicly available information, In-Q-Tel appears to lead the DoD with 
actual investments in this category (In-Q-Tel, 2007).   There is no indication the other 
Government VC initiatives make significant investments in medical and biotechnology.  
Because of this gap, the government should consider using the Communication Catalyst 
Model to spur additional R&D.   
7. Language and Cultural 
The DoD’s continued emphasis on learning languages and understanding cultures 
should manifest itself primarily in further development of products relevant to theater 
operations.   We believe the Communication Catalyst models can be of greatest 
assistance here.  For example, DeVenCI could interact with VCs, university officials, and 
industry leaders (i.e.,  well-known publishers like Berlitz, Pimsleur, et al) and urge them 
to develop beneficial products in less-researched areas.  But are there not plenty of 
language materials available?  If our next major theater of operations were Western 
Europe, the answer would be yes.  Go to any large bookstore, and witness the barrage of 
books and CDs in Spanish, French, or German.  Then as a comparison, see the amount of 
materials available for Dari, Pashto, Mandarin, Farsi, and Iraqi Arabic—little, if any.  
Other investment opportunities might involve biotechnology, so as to better understand 
cognitive processes associated with learning languages.  These discoveries may lead to 
innovative products which will help DoD members assimilate difficult languages sooner.  
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8. Logistics 
Because the researchers view military logistics and commercial logistics as vastly 
different, we believe the DoD would find it very difficult to band with VCs to develop 
dual-use technologies suitable for military without substantial modification.  Wal-Mart’s 
world-class “cross-docking” logistics system may be considered second to none, but at 
the same time, Target is not firing salvos at its warehouses or semis to gain market share.  
That is, the threats to the military logistics system are not the same as for commercial 
entities.   
In searching through the Venture Economics Industry Codes (VEIC), the 
researchers found that logistics involved a mix of technologies already present in the 
foregoing categories, to include Internet developments, software packages, and electronic 
devices.  That is, logistics appears to be an aggregate of technologies from other areas.  
Thus, military logistics seems most apt to benefit from developments in computer 
software and hardware sectors.  To a lesser extent, the business/financial and 
industrial/energy sectors have valuable input for logistics, only for the reason that fewer 
relevant VEICs were found in the researchers’ analysis as compared to the other sectors.  
The Communication Catalyst VC models, which we know have especially close ties to 
the information technology world, are best positioned to spread the word about logistical 
gaps.  Equity investments are not recommended because the products likely to help the 
DoD would probably be of little interest to many commercial companies; the ensuing 
technologies would be diversified enough for commercial sales.  This does not mean the 
DoD has nothing to learn from the commercial world. On the contrary: the most effective 
way to incorporate commercial best practices for logistics is already happening—through 




VII.  CONCLUSION 
This research project’s primary question asked whether Government VC should 
be executed in a centralized or decentralized manner.  In order to determine the answer to 
this question, this paper had three research objectives: 1) to determine the differences, as 
well as the advantages and disadvantages, of the various Government VC initiatives, 2) to 
compare and contrast the investment portfolios of the Government VC initiatives, and 3) 
to determine if the VC industry provides a relevant source for government R&D. 
This project characterized the distinction between the VC initiatives as a 
spectrum.  The Government VC Spectrum characterizes the initiatives as an Equity 
Investment, Grant, or Communication Catalyst Model.  The table below summarizes the 
specific advantages and disadvantages for each of these models. 
 
 
Figure 31.   Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages 
 of Government VC Models 
 
Each of the current Government VC initiatives possesses distinguishing 
characteristics that classify it as an Equity Investment, Grant, or Communication Catalyst 
Model.  This specialization enables the government to take advantage of the strengths of 
VC at various stages of financing.  The Communication Catalyst Model enables the 
government to identify technologies in all stages at a relatively low cost.  The Grant 
Model enables the government to fill the funding gap for startup companies and to bring 
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technologies to the market that might otherwise have never matured.  The Equity 
Investment Model takes advantage of the early stages of financing by leveraging the 
government’s relatively small amount of capital to gain insight and to influence to startup 
company decisions. 
In comparing and contrasting the government VC initiatives to the VC industry, 
research showed that the government VC initiatives’ total capital under management 
(budget) is significant enough compared to some of the private VC firms.  The 
government VC initiatives align with current VC trends by investing in early stage 
(Series A and B) funds with the increase in startup and seed-stage companies.  The exits 
(IPOs or M&A activity) for companies with equity investments by the government are 
comparable or exceed the averages in the VC industry.  Even though government VC 
initiatives do not focus on ROI in contrast to the VC industry, there is evidence for 
potential ROI for equity investments.  These returns can further support R&D efforts for 
the government.  Decentralization enables the government to effectively manage its 
limited capital, while at the same time positioning it to exploit the recent increase in 
early-stage companies in the VC industry.  
To determine if the VC industry provides a relevant source for government R&D, 
this project analyzed the QDR’s recommended investment areas.  VC is a relevant source 
for government R&D for three primary reasons.  First, VC is a relevant due to the ever-
increasing employment of dual-use technologies.  Second, traditional government 
acquisition practices tend to be slower, do not leverage funds, and do not share processes 
with the commercial to the same degree as VC.  Lastly, the QDR investment areas are 
highly reliant on Internet-based technologies, which coincide with VC trends.     
Numerous arguments support centralizing Government VC decision-making.  
Centralized execution increases control, insight, awareness, and accountability.  In 
addition, centralization provides a greater pool of capital.  Unfortunately, all the 
arguments for centralization are favored by a risk-averse culture.  In order to truly 
harness the innovation from VC, the government must take risks.  Indeed, executing VC 
in a decentralized manner enables the government to leverage risk across the VC model 
spectrum.   
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Despite the benefits of the VC initiatives, the government must still contend with 
the challenge posed by technology transition.  Perhaps this is a crossover from the same 
problem plaguing traditional government acquisition and R&D efforts.   As the 
government concentrates on VC, it should plan to integrate VC initiatives and technology 
transition efforts.  Failure to do so will nullify the premise of Government VC—to bring 
about a return on technology.   
In summary, the government should continue to foster decentralized VC 
execution.  The government needs to support efforts that effectively import innovative 
technologies and provide improved capabilities to the warfighter.  The current 
Government VC initiatives achieve these goals through equity investments, grants, and 
communication forums.  By recognizing the advantages and disadvantages of the 
initiatives, the government can make improved decisions about how to use VC in the 
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APPENDIX A. VC PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 










B. NTA-RTVG PORTFOLIO COMPANIES (PARTNERS) 
Independent Needs Analysis and Outreach, Technology Assessment and Evaluation 
• Ashland Institute  
• BearingPoint  
• Cipher Systems  
• Gartner  
• KENTIA Management Corporation  
• Potomac Institute  
• Sullivan-Haave  
• Swiftsure Spatial Systems  
• SYNTEK Technologies  




Technology Research and Development and Prototyping 
• Applied Minds  
• Atinav  
• BBN Technologies  
• Carnegie Mellon University  
• Center for Higher Learning  
• George Mason University  
• Georgia Tech Research Institute  
• Midwest Research Institute  
• Mississippi Enterprise for Technology  
• Mississippi Space Commerce Initiative  
• Motorola  
• Penn State University Applied Research 
Laboratory  
• Purdue University  
• Rockwell Scientific Company  
• Sarnoff Corporation  
• Southwest Research Institute  
• SRI International  
• Thirteen/WNET New York  
• University at Buffalo, State University of 
New York  
• University of Florida  
• University of Illinois Urbana—Champaign  
• University of Southern Mississippi  
• User Systems  
• Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State 
University  




Product Development and Commercialization 
• Aquilent  
• Brilliant Media  
• Cambridge Display Technology  
• Cree  
• DigitalGlobe  
• ESRI  
• Fortrex Technologies  
• HP Invent  
• ImageLinks  
• InPhase Technologies  
• Iridian Technologies  
• Leica Geosystems GIS and Mapping  
• Magfusion  
• Microlab  
• ObjectFX  
• Observera  
• PacketVideo  
• Saffron Technology  
• Scyld Computing Technology  
• Semandex Networks  
• Terabit Corporation  
• Teranex  
• The Boeing Company  
• Trimble  
• U.S. Display Consortium  
• Vexcel Corporation  
• Virage  














Technology Insertion and System Integration 
• Applied Signal Technology  
• Booz Allen Hamilton  
• Computer Sciences Corporation  
• EER Systems  
• General Dynamics  
• IBM Consulting  
• Intergraph Corporation  
• Lockheed Martin Corporation  
• Northrop Grumman—TASC  
• Open Source  
• Radiance Technologies  
• Raytheon  
• SAIC  
• SMI Defense Group  
• Titan Systems Corporation  
• Unisys Corporation  
 
C. ACIN PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 
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APPENDIX B. QDR REFERENCES 
This appendix contains specific references to technologies and capabilities from the QDR 
that the government must consider before executing a VC initiative.  These are direct 
quotes from the QDR (2006, February 6).  Bolded areas are of particular importance; 
emphasis added by the researchers.  
 
A. DOD OVERALL GOALS 
- This war requires the U.S. military to adopt unconventional 
and indirect approaches (p. 1).   
 
- The aim is to possess sufficient capability to convince any 
potential adversary that it cannot prevail in a conflict and that 
engaging in conflict entails substantial strategic risks beyond 
military defeat (p. 31). 
 
- [The] Department’s senior civilian and military leaders 
identified four priority areas for examination during the QDR: 
Defeating terrorist networks.  Defending the homeland in 
depth.  Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.  
Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or 
using WMD (p. 33).  
 
- During this QDR, senior leaders confirmed the importance of 
the main elements of that Force Planning Construct: 
maintaining the ability to defend the U.S. homeland; 
continuing to operate in and from forward areas; and above all, 
the importance of maintaining capabilities and forces to 
wage multiple campaigns in an overlapping time frame—
for which there may be little or no warning of attack. This 
latter capability in particular remains a strong deterrent against 
opportunistic aggression or attempted coercion (p. 36).  
 
- Two fundamental imperatives for the Department of Defense: 
Continuing to reorient the Department’s capabilities and 
forces to be more agile in this time of war, to prepare for 
wider asymmetric challenges and to hedge against 






B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
- Increase resources to develop software, tactics, techniques, 
procedures and other initiatives needed to support the Global 
Force Management System (p. 60). 
 
- Increase investment to implement the Global Information 
Grid (GID), defend and protect information and networks 
and focus research and development on its protection. Develop 
an information-sharing strategy to guide operations with 
Federal, state, local and coalition partners (p. 59).  
 
- During the QDR, the senior leadership of the Department 
considered potential adjustments to capabilities and forces 
in light of the four focus areas and refined Force Planning 
Construct. They identified desired future force characteristics 
prior to developing proposals for the following capability 
portfolios: joint ground; special operations forces; joint air; 
joint maritime; tailored deterrence; combating WMD; joint 
mobility; ISR and space capabilities; net-centricity; and joint 
command and control (p. 41).   
 
- [The Department must] make additional investments in 
information assurance capabilities to protect information and 
the Department’s computer networks (p. 50).  
 
- [The Department must] automate and link key planning 
processes in a networked, virtual environment to enable 
real-time collaboration and rapid production of high-quality 
planning products (p. 60).  
 
- [The Department must find] capabilities to locate, tag and 
track terrorists in all domains, including cyberspace (p. 23).  
 
- At the same time, expanded reliance on sophisticated 
electronic technologies by the United States, its allies and 
partners increases their vulnerability to the destructive 
effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP)—the energy burst 
given off during a nuclear weapon explosion (p. 33).   
 
- [The Department must acquire] secure broadband 
communications into denied or contested areas to support 
penetrating surveillance and strike systems (p. 55).  
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- [The Department must acquire] joint command and control 
capabilities that are survivable in the face of WMD-, 
electronic, or cyber-attacks (p. 32).  
C. MEDICAL/BIOLOGICAL 
- Transforming the Medical Health System (MHS). New 
breakthroughs in science and health, and new innovations 
in prevention and wellness offer the opportunity to develop a 
21st-century Military Health System that will improve health 
and save both lives and money (p. 72). 
 
- [The Department is] is helping to develop vaccines for Project 
BioShield, a national effort to accelerate the development of 
medical countermeasures to defend against potential 
biological attacks. In Project BioWatch, the Department 
collaborates with other Federal agencies on improving 
technologies and procedures to detect and identify 
biological attacks. In 2004, the Department led the 
establishment of the National BioDefense Campus at Fort 
Detrick, Maryland, which provides a means for coordination 
among agencies working on research and development of 
medical biological defenses (p. 15).  
 
- [The Department must acquire] broad spectrum medical 
countermeasures to defend against genetically engineered 
or naturally mutating pathogens for which there are no 
current defenses (p. 39).  
 
- To strengthen homeland defense and homeland security, the 
Department will fund a $1.5 billion initiative over the next 
five years to develop broad-spectrum medical 
countermeasures against the threat of genetically engineered 
bio-terror agents. Additional initiatives will include developing 
advanced detection and deterrent technologies and 
facilitating full-scale civil-military exercises (p. 17).  
 
- For the next five years, beginning in Fiscal Year 2006, the 
Department is further increasing funding for the Chemical 
Biological Defense Program (CBDP) by an additional $2.1 
billion (an increase of approximately 20%), focused 
primarily on improving its research, development and testing 
infrastructure as well as expanding efforts to improve defenses 
against emerging chemical and biological threats (p. 63).  
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- Progress to Date: Since the 2001 QDR, the Department has 
nearly doubled its investments in chemical and biological 
defenses and implemented several important organizational 
changes to address the challenges posed by WMD more 
effectively (p. 63).  
D. INTELLIGENCE & SURVEILLANCE 
- The ability of the future force to establish an “unblinking 
eye” over the battle-space through persistent surveillance will 
be key to conducting effective joint operations. Future 
capabilities in ISR, including those operating in space, will 
support operations against any target, day or night, in any 
weather, and in denied or contested areas. The aim is to 
integrate global awareness with local precision. Intelligence 
functions will be fully integrated with operations down to the 
tactical level, with far greater ability to reach back to 
intelligence collection systems and analytic capabilities outside 
the theater (p. 55).  
 
- Capabilities and organizations to help fuse intelligence and 
operations to speed action based on time-sensitive 
intelligence (p. 35).  
 
- Investments in moving target indicator and synthetic 
aperture radar capabilities, including Space Radar, will grow 
to provide a highly persistent capability to identify and track 
moving ground targets in denied areas (p. 69).  
 
- One of the greatest challenges facing U.S. forces is finding 
the enemy and then rapidly acting on that information. To 
address this challenge in Iraq, the Department has established 
in the theater the Joint Intelligence Operations Center—Iraq. 
This Center integrates intelligence from all sources—imagery, 
signals intelligence, and human intelligence—and then fuses 
that information with planning and execution functions to 
support operations that are often conducted within hours or 
even minutes of receiving an intelligence (p. 11). 
 
- [The Department has a] need for considerably better fusion 
of intelligence and operations to produce action plans that can 
be executed in real time.  [We have come to the] realization 
that everything done in this Department must contribute to 
joint warfighting capability (p. 23).  
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- [The Department must improve] air and maritime domain 
awareness capabilities to provide increased situational 
awareness and shared information on potential threats 
through rapid collection, fusion and analysis (p. 27).  
-  
- [The Department must] improve responsive space access, 
satellite operations, and other space-enabling capabilities. 
Capability portfolios would include network-based command 
and control, communications on the move and information 
fusion. Current and evolving threats highlight the need to 
design, operate and defend the network to ensure continuity of 
joint operations (p. 70).  
 
- [The Department shall be] invested in new equipment, 
technology and platforms for the forces, including 
advanced combat capabilities: Stryker Brigades, Littoral 
Combat Ships, converted cruise-missile firing submarines, 
unmanned vehicles and advanced tactical aircraft—all linked 
by Net-centric Warfare systems (p. viii).  
 
E. LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL SKILLS 
- Recent operations have reinforced the need for U.S. forces to 
have greater language skills and cultural awareness. It is 
advantageous for U.S. forces to speak the languages of the 
regions (p. 14).  
 
- [The] Department will increase investments focused on 
developing and maintaining appropriate language, cultural, 
and information technology skills (p. 5).   
 
F. NEED TO MINIMIZE COSTS AND INNOVATE 
- Lessons from these missions, which informed the QDR’s 
deliberations and conclusions, include the critical importance 
of minimizing costs to the United States while imposing costs 
on adversaries, in particular by sustaining America’s 
scientific and technological advantage over potential 
competitors (p. 3).  
 
- “The principles of transparency, constructive competition to 
encourage innovation, agility and adaptability, collaboration 
and partnership should guide the formulation of new strategic 
processes and organizational structures” (p. 1).  
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- Capital Acquisition and Macro Resource Allocation—Shape 
the Department’s major investments in people, equipment, 
concepts and organizations to support the Nation’s objectives 
most effectively (p. 66). 
 
- [The Department] must also provide the best possible value to 
the American taxpayer. Second, the Department must provide 
information and analysis necessary to make timely and 
well-reasoned decisions. Third, the Department must 
undertake reforms to reduce redundancies and ensure the 
efficient flow of business processes (p. 65).  
 
 
- In confronting the range of security challenges it will face in 
the 21stcentury, the United States must constantly strive to 
minimize its own costs in terms of lives and treasure, while 
imposing unsustainable costs on its adversaries. Sustaining 
America’s scientific and technological advantages over any 
potential competitor contributes to the nation’s ability to 
dissuade future forms of military competition (p. 18).  
 
- Today, the armed forces are hampered by inefficient 
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